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I. INTRODUCTION
A recent front-page New York Times article highlighted a dispute about how
prosecutors should exercise discretion when, after criminal proceedings have
ended, new information casts doubt on a convicted defendant's guilt.1 The subject
of the article was the New York state-court conviction of two men for the 1990
murder of a bouncer outside the Palladium nightclub in lower Manhattan and the
state prosecution's response years later, after a federal informant admitted that he
and a fellow gang member, not the convicted defendants, were responsible for the
* 2shooting.
Over a lengthy period chronicled by documentary filmmakers, Bronx
detectives unearthed increasing amounts of exculpatory evidence3 while the
Manhattan prosecutor's office appeared indifferent if not hostile to their efforts.
4
But eventually, the office appointed a senior trial prosecutor to work with other
1 The authors thank Sara Sun Beale for organizing an engaging roundtable discussion and
inviting their participation. The authors also thank Fordham law students, Adam Calvert and David
Ziegler, and Cardozo law student, Bernard Eyth, for their research assistance. Finally, the authors
thank Professor Daniel Medwed for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
. Louis Stein Professor of Law and Director of the Stein Center for Law and Ethics, Fordham
University School of Law.
** Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the Jacob Burns Ethics Center in the Practice of
Law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
I Benjamin Weiser, Doubting Case, City Prosecutor Aided Defense, N.Y. TIMES, June 23,
2008, at Al.
2 Id. Other sources have covered the case in great detail. See Cooley Godward Kronish
LLP, Pro Bono: Case Studies, The People of the State of New York v. David Lemus and Olmedo
Hidalgo, http://www.cooley.compractices/casestudies.aspx?casestudyid=&practiceid=37411920 (last
visited Jan. 20, 2009); Dateline NBC: In the Shadow of Justice,
http://www.msnbc.msn.conid/20091700/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
3 See Dateline NBC: In the Shadow of Justice, supra note 2; see also Sabrina Tavemise, One
More Chance to Overturn Their Murder Convictions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2005, at B4. (In an
unrelated investigation, a gang member by the name of Joey Pillot admitted that he and another gang
member, Thomas Morales, were the two men who did the shooting.).
4 See Dateline NBC: In the Shadow of Justice, supra note 2; see also Damien Cave, Lawyers
Want New Hearing for 2 Convicted in 1990 Murder, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2004, at B3. ("[Tihe
district attorney's office had been moving too slowly and withholding evidence. It took more than a
year for summaries of interviews with witnesses to make their way to the defense, despite several
requests .... ).
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detectives to investigate the Palladium convictions.5 After almost two years, the
prosecutor concluded that the convicted defendants were innocent, and he
recommended supporting their application to set aside their convictions.6 The
heads of the office rejected the recommendation, however, and directed the senior
prosecutor to oppose the application in court.7 According to the news account, he
did so nominally, while ensuring that all the exculpatory evidence came out at the
judicial hearing, thereby subverting the district attorney's aim of preserving the
convictions. 8 At the hearing's end, the senior prosecutor persuaded his superiors to
assent to overturning the conviction of one defendant but not the other, 9 and when
the court nonetheless vacated both convictions,' ° the district attorney's office
insisted on retrying the second defendant."i By then, the senior prosecutor had
resigned from the office.' 2 The trial ended in acquittal in November 2007.13
5 See Dateline NBC: In the Shadow of Justice, supra note 2; see also Sabrina Tavemise, New
Evidence Gives Defense Hope in '90 Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2005, at B 1. ("Prosecutors, too,
have worked hard to review the case. For the past year, Daniel Bibb, of the cold case unit at the
district attorney's office, has interviewed more than 50 people in 14 states, 3 New York State prisons
and 8 federal prisons .... ").
6 See Weiser, supra note 1 (A re-examination by Daniel Bibb of the district attorney's office
came to the conclusion that "[h]e believed that the two imprisoned men were not guilty, and that their
convictions should be dropped."); Sabrina Tavernise, A Prosecutor's Report Raises Doubts About 2
Convictions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2005, at B2. (The report stated: "Significant evidence indicates
that Lemus and Hidalgo were NOT involved in the homicide."); Anemona Hartocollis, Citing New
Admission, Lawyers Seek Murder Case's Dismissal, N.Y. TIMES (Final Edition), May 13, 2007, at 31.
("In a television interview, Daniel Bibb, a former prosecutor in the Manhattan district attorney's
office, said that he believed the defendant, David Lemus, was the wrong man.").
7 Weiser, supra note 1. (Despite Mr. Bibb's conclusion that the two men were innocent, "top
officials told him... to go into a court hearing and defend the case anyway.").
8 See id. ("He tracked down hard-to-find or reluctant witnesses who pointed to other
suspects and prepared them to testify for the defense. He talked strategy with defense lawyers. And
when they veered from his coaching, he cornered them in the hallway and corrected them.").
9 Sabrina Tavernise, Prosecutors Asking Court to Free Convict, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2005,
at B 1. ("Prosecutors said the conviction of Olmado Hidalgo should be overturned because new
evidence that has surfaced would cause a jury to look more favorably on his case. They did not ask
the judge to cancel the conviction of Mr. Hidalgo's co-defendant, David Lemus, because they said
the new evidence would not have helped him."). After the district attorney agreed that Hidalgo's
conviction should be vacated and that he should not be retried, Hidalgo commenced a civil rights
action against the district attorney's office and others based on his wrongful conviction. The action
reportedly resulted in a $2.6 million settlement. See Benjamin Weiser, Settlement for Man Wrongly
Convicted in Palladium Killing, N.Y. TIMES, March 31, 2009, at A 19.
l0 See Anemona Hartocollis & Colin Moynihan, Free After 14 Years, and Learning to Use a
Cell, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2005, at B3 ("David Lemus ... walked out of State Supreme Court in
Lower Manhattan yesterday a free man, hours after a judge overturned his conviction in the
killing.... In July, Justice Hayes overturned Mr. Hidalgo's conviction .... ).
11 See id. ("Mr. Lemus's troubles are not over. Prosecutors said yesterday that they intended
to retry him.").
12 See Weiser, supra note 1.
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The question in the Palladium case was not the familiar one of how to
exercise prosecutorial discretion regarding whether to institute charges and
proceed to trial. Rather, the question was how to exercise prosecutorial authority
after a conviction is obtained. Nevertheless, both the prosecutor's office and the
former senior prosecutor implicitly analogized to how prosecutors exercise
discretion at the outset of a prosecution. The prosecutor's office issued an official
statement that, "[n]obody in this office is ever required to prosecute someone they
believe is innocent."' 4 The senior prosecutor similarly observed that traditionally,
"[i]f the evidence doesn't convince" the prosecutor, he should make the tough
decision not to proceed to trial, rather than leaving the decision to the judge and
jury.
5
The observations raised more questions than they answered, however. For
example, assuming that the ultimate decision whether to bring a case rests with the
elected district attorney, not the trial prosecutor, by what standard and through
what process should the district attorney decide whether to bring or proceed on
criminal charges in light of doubts about the defendant's guilt? How convinced
must the ultimate decision-maker be of the defendant's guilt before proceeding
with a trial? And how does this standard translate when a convicted defendant's
guilt is reexamined? If the prosecutor who conducted the post-conviction
investigation is personally convinced of the defendant's innocence, or has
reasonable doubts about the defendant's guilt, should the chief prosecutor (a) defer
to that judgment and join in a post-conviction motion to set aside the conviction;
(b) assign that prosecutor to conduct post-conviction proceedings in a manner that
assures that all the exculpatory evidence is fairly presented; or (c) assign a
different prosecutor to defend the convictions in a matter that assures that
exculpatory evidence is tested in an adversary proceeding?
The New York Times article raised questions about how the district attorney
made the decision to reject the senior prosecutor's recommendation to assent to the
defendants' release, suggesting that the district attorney may have been motivated
by political self-interest during an election year in which his opponent publicly
criticized how his office had handled the case.16 In a letter to the editor, the district
attorney disputed this, however. 7 He explained that his office's investigation was
ongoing and unresolved at the time of the post-conviction hearing, and his office's
"mission was to conduct a fact-finding proceeding, with witnesses under oath and
13 Anemona Hartocollis, Man Convicted in Club Death is Acquitted at Second Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2007, at B3.
14 See Weiser, supra note 1.
15 Id.
16 Id. ("As the hearing unfolded in 2005, Mr. Morgenthau, running for re-election, was
sharply criticized by an opponent who said he had prosecuted the wrong men.").
17 Robert M. Morgenthau, Letter to the Editor, The Manhattan District Attorney Responds,
N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2008,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D03E5D71631F933A05755COA96E9C8B63.
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subject to cross-examination, affording us the opportunity to resolve substantial
issues involving the weight and credibility of the evidence."1 8 The news account
also raised questions about how the senior prosecutor handled the post-conviction
proceedings after his recommendation was rejected. Professor Stephen Gillers
commented that the prosecutor acted improperly by "subvert[ing] his client's
case," whereas one of the defense lawyers in the case took the view that the senior
prosecutor had honorably fulfilled his "duty to search out the truth."' 19 The latter
view seems more reasonable given the district attorney's explanation that his office
was conducting a fact-finding proceeding, not adopting an adversarial stance.
The Palladium case is unusual in lifting the curtain, if only slightly, on
internal disagreement over whether and, if so, how to defend a conviction when
new evidence raises substantial doubts about its reliability.20 But the problem that
precipitated the disagreement is a recurring one. Often, even years after a
conviction, witnesses recant their testimony, additional witnesses come forward, or
other new evidence or information emerges that tends to exonerate a convicted
defendant.2 '
There is now a burgeoning literature on wrongful criminal convictions thanks
in large part to the Innocence Project and DNA testing.22 No one knows how
many people who plead guilty or who are convicted by a jury are factually
innocent. But the number of exonerations in the comparatively few old cases in
18 Id.
19 Weiser, supra note 1. Likewise, in a posting on the web, Professor David Luban offered a
defense of the senior prosecutor's conduct. See David Luban, Legal Profession Blog, Luban on New
York Prosecutor Story: When a Good Prosecutor Throws a Case,
http:/lawprofessors.typepad.comlegal-profession/2008/06/when-a-good-pro.html (last visited Jan.
20, 2009). The state court's disciplinary agency later looked at the matter and concluded that
disciplinary proceedings against the prosecutor were unwarranted. Benjamin Weiser, Lawyer Who
Threw a Case is Vindicated, Not Punished, N.Y. TIMES, March 5, 2009, at A23.
20 As some have argued, there is a significant lack of transparency in prosecutorial decision-
making. See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1521,
1566 (1981) (arguing that with respect to prosecutorial discretion generally, "[w]e presently tolerate a
degree of secrecy in one of our most crucial decisionmaking agencies that is not only inconsistent
with an open and decent system of justice, but that may not even be efficient in avoiding the
additional effort necessary to make the system accountable.").
21 See discussion infra Part II.A.
22 See, e.g., JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN
JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND How TO MAKE IT RIGHT (2003) (chronicling multiple stories of uncovering
wrongful convictions); Jennifer Boemer, In the Interest of Justice: Granting Post-Conviction
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Testing to Inmates, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1971 (2001)
(discussing the use of DNA testing in exonerations); Daniel S. Medwed, Anatomy of a Wrongful
Conviction: Theoretical Implications and Practical Solutions, 51 VILL. L. REv. 337, 340-56 (2006)
(detailing the story of David Wong, a man wrongfully convicted in 1984 and exonerated in 2004 after
new witnesses came forward and other witnesses recanted earlier testimony); Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law, Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Jan. 20, 2009)
[hereinafter Innocence Project] (stating that 234 people have been exonerated through post-
conviction DNA testing); Northwestern University School of Law Center on Wrongful Convictions,
http://www.law.northwestem.edu/wrongfulconvictions (last visited Jan. 20, 2009) (same).
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which DNA testing can be conducted suggests that the numbers are meaningful.2 3
Mistakes are made notwithstanding that the reasonable doubt standard and other
features of the criminal process are designed to prevent wrongful convictions on
the premise that it is better for factually guilty defendants to go free than for
innocent defendants be punished.24  Precisely because of the traditional societal
aversion to wrongful convictions, the apparent prevalence of the problem should
be a cause of public concern.
Building on prior judicial pronouncements,25 new ABA model ethics rules
propose that when a prosecutor learns of new exculpatory evidence that is
"material" and "credible," and that establishes "a reasonable likelihood" that a
convicted defendant is innocent, the prosecutor should disclose the new evidence
to the court and to the defendant and conduct a reasonable investigation to
determine whether a miscarriage of justice in fact occurred 6 Further, the model
rules would call on the prosecutor to attempt to set the conviction aside if the
investigation leads to "clear and convincing" evidence of the defendant's
23 See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2005) (finding that from 1989 through 2003 there were 340
exonerations in the United States and detailing the ways the defendants were exonerated); D. Michael
Risinger, Innocents Convicted. An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761 (2007) (analyzing data from convictions in the 1980s and finding that
there is about a 3.3% error rate for capital convictions during that time period).
24 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("I view the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental
value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty
man go free.").
25 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 n.25 (1976) (observing that prosecutors are
"bound by the ethics of [their] office to inform the appropriate authority of after-acquired or other
information that casts doubt upon the correctness of the conviction"); Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d
746, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[W]e believe the state is under an obligation to come forward with any
exculpatory ... evidence in its possession. We do not refer to the state's past duty to turn over
exculpatory evidence at trial, but to its present duty to turn over exculpatory evidence relevant to the
instant habeas corpus proceeding."); Houston v. Partee, 978 F.2d 362, 366-69 (7th Cir. 1992)
(denying claim of prosecutorial immunity for failure to turn over post-conviction, newly discovered
exculpatory evidence because the evidence was discovered outside of the prosecutor's duties and
because of the absence of any judicial check at that point in the process); Monroe v. Butler, 690 F.
Supp. 521, 525 (E.D. La. 1988) (refusing to limit the application of Brady to pre-conviction, saying,
"[t]he prosecutor's duty to disclose material, exculpatory evidence continues through the period
allowed by the State for post-conviction relief.").
26 MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT [hereinafter A.B.A. MODEL RuLEs], R. 3.8(g) ("When a
prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a
convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted, the prosecutor
shall: (1) promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or authority, and (2) if the
conviction was obtained in the prosecutor's jurisdiction, (i) promptly disclose that evidence to the
defendant unless a court authorizes delay, and (ii) undertake further investigation, or make reasonable
efforts to cause an investigation, to determine whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that
the defendant did not commit.").
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innocence.27 But state courts have not yet adopted these rules and, in any event,
the rules set standards meant to be the bare minimum, not to establish the full
scope of prosecutors' responsibility.28 They would leave much to prosecutors'
discretion.
29
Traditionally, discussions of prosecutorial discretion focus on charging and
plea bargaining decisions. 30 But on occasions when new evidence casts doubt on a
convicted defendant's guilt, questions of prosecutorial discretion take on
comparatively greater importance. When there is an inadequate factual basis for
criminal charges, a criminal trial will often (though not invariably) act as a
corrective. 31 In contrast, the legal process holds out little hope for wrongfully
convicted defendants, especially in the absence of help from prosecutors.
Commentators have written about psychological reasons why prosecutors might be
unduly skeptical of post-conviction challenges,32 have identified institutional
" Id. at R. 3.8(h) ("When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing
that a defendant in the prosecutor's jurisdiction was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not
commit, the prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction."). For a discussion of R. 3.8(g) & (h)
and the adoption process, see Niki Kuckes, The State of Rule 3.8: Prosecutorial Ethics Reform Since
Ethics 2000, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics (forthcoming 2009).
28 See CRIM. JUST. SEC., AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2008),
available at
http://www.abanet.orglleadershipl2008/midyear/sum-of rec-docs/hundredfiveb_105BFINAL.doc
(accompanying proposed A.B.A. Model Rule 3.8(g) & (h); "The Rule and Comments are designed to
provide clear guidance to prosecutors concerning their minimum disciplinary responsibilities, with
the expectation that, as ministers of justice, prosecutors routinely will and should go beyond the
disciplinary minimum. In many instances, a prosecutor will receive information about a defendant
that does not trigger the rule's disclosure obligation and will be called upon to decide whether that
information is nevertheless sufficient to require some investigation."); see also A.B.A. MODEL
RULES, Scope 16 ("The Rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that
should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules.
The Rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law.").
29 See id. at R. 3.8, cmt. 9 ("A prosecutor's independent judgment, made in good faith, that
the new evidence is not of such nature as to trigger the obligations of sections (g) and (h), though
subsequently determined to have been erroneous, does not constitute a violation of this Rule.").
30 See, e.g., Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L.
REv. 1471 (1993) (discussing the exercise of discretion in plea bargaining); Leslie C. Griffin, The
Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 259 (2001) (discussing discretion in the plea
bargaining and charging stages); Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion and Its Limits, 50 AM. J.
COMP. L. SuPP. 643 (2002) (discussing discretion in the charging stage).
31 See Keith Findley, Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the
Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL L. REv. 893 (2008) (describing procedural and evidentiary rules
and forensic science issues that place innocent defendants at a disadvantage in the criminal justice
process); George C. Thomas 1II et al., Is It Ever Too Late for Innocence? Finality, Efficiency, and
Claims of Innocence, 64 U. Prrr. L. REv. 263, 272-73 (2003) (arguing that the trial process cannot
weed out all innocent defendants because weak cases are the ones most likely to be tried, the trial
process cannot protect against incompetent defense lawyering and the prevalence of plea bargaining
means that most defendants do not receive the benefit of the final screening process of a trial).
32 See Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J.
L. & LIBERTY 512 (2007) [hereinafter Burke, Invitation to Prosecutors] (discussing strategies that
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impediments to a fair response,33 and have proposed structural reform.34 But
comparatively little attention has been given to the fundamental question of what
we affirmatively expect prosecutors to do when new evidence comes their way
suggesting that a convicted person may be innocent.3 5  This article explores that
question.
might help prosecutors overcome cognitive biases in discretionary matters); Alafair S. Burke,
Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1587 (2006) [hereinafter Burke, Cognitive Science] (stating that four cognitive biases affect
prosecutor's decision-making: confirmation bias, selective information processing, belief
perseverance and the avoidance of cognitive dissonance); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The
Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 291 (2006) (discussing
individual and institutional sources and effects of tunnel vision and suggesting systemic remedies);
Dianne L. Martin, Lessons About Justice from the "Laboratory" of Wrongful Convictions: Tunnel
Vision, the Construction of Guilt and Informer Evidence, 70 UMKC L. REv. 847 (2002) (examining
Canadian and British materials showing that tunnel vision of prosecutors and the use of informant
testimony contribute to wrongful convictions); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial
Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 138-48 (2004) [hereinafter
Medwed, Zeal Deal] (outlining various reasons why prosecutors oppose post-conviction claims of
innocence: prosecutors come to value convictions as a sign of self-worth and have trouble
questioning this self-affirmance, prosecutors may feel that being hard-nosed serves the public good,
often the prosecutor does not receive the defendant's evidence at the charging stage, prosecutors
become personally committed to the conviction and have trouble grappling with the possibility that
the wrong man is behind bars, in many offices there is a culture of winning cases, prosecutors are
unwillingness to have victims revisit an allegedly decided case); Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor
as Minister of Justice: Preaching to the Unconverted from the Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L.
REV. 35 (2009) [hereinafter Medwed, Preaching] (arguing for a minister of justice model to
overcome individual and institutional incentives to uphold the trial result).
33 See Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 309,
352 (2001) ("Because of political or institutional constraints .... prosecutors may be fearful of
offending police, victims, or superiors by appearing to be too defense-minded."); Judith A. Goldberg
& David M. Siegel, The Ethical Obligations of Prosecutors in Cases Involving Postconviction
Claims ofInnocence, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 389, 409 (2002) (stating that prosecutor's offices often feel
public pressure not to look soft on crime).
34 See Tim Bakken, Truth and Innocence Procedures to Free Innocent Persons: Beyond the
Adversarial System, 41 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 547 (2008) (proposing the option of a more
inquisitorial process); Goldberg & Siegel, supra note 33, at 410-12 (proposing that prosecutors
should seek the most accurate testing and fully disclose exculpatory evidence, but should take
account of the need for finality); D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Reformed
Standards for the Trial and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 Hous. L. REV. 1281 (2004)
(proposing different evidentiary standards for innocence claims and adoption of a standard of review
similar to Britain's "unsafe verdict" standard); Fred C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in Serving
Justice After Convictions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 171, 230-38 (2005) (proposing changes in the structure
of the prosecutor's office, legislation and the ethics codes); Medwed, Preaching, supra note 32
(proposing post-conviction units on a minister of justice model within prosecutors' offices).
35 Among the most significant prior writings addressing prosecutorial discretion in the post-
conviction stage are those by Daniel Medwed and Fred Zacharias. See Medwed, Zeal Deal, supra
note 32 (exploring the influence of the prosecutors' office and political pressures in causing
prosecutors to oppose post-conviction claims of innocence); Medwed, Preaching, supra note 32
(exploring prosecutorial attitudes post-conviction); Zacharias, supra note 34 (discussing how
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Refining the Question
In asking how prosecutors should respond when new evidence or information
casts doubt on the factual guilt of a convicted defendant, it is important to
distinguish and put to the side situations in which the prosecutor learns of a
possible procedural defect that casts doubt on the fairness of the adjudication, such
as when the prosecutor discovers that exculpatory material was arguably withheld
in violation of Brady v. Maryland36 or that the trial jurors may have improperly
considered extra-record evidence. 37  Although there are many roadblocks to
challenging convictions on any ground, legal error is much easier to challenge on
appeal or in post-conviction hearings. 38 Understandably, great weight is put on
guilty verdicts when they are the outcome of knowing and voluntary guilty pleas
39
or procedurally fair trials.4° Courts may overturn jury verdicts in the rare cases in
which no reasonable jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,4 but
courts may not otherwise substitute their evaluation of the strength of the evidence
prosecutors are implicated in post-conviction claims of innocence, and the legal and ethical
considerations surrounding their actions).
36 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (a prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory, material evidence is a
violation of due process if it occurs before or during trial).
37 See, e.g., Drew v. Collins, 964 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1992) (jury misconduct for
considering parole law during sentencing deliberations); United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777, 783
(2d Cir. 1985) (consideration of extra-record evidence may amount to juror misconduct).
38 See, e.g., Thomas Ill et al., supra note 31, at 277-81 (discussing how state courts have been
forced to craft exceptions so that claims of innocence not based on legal error can be heard as well as
how state laws have barred courts from hearing such claims altogether); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S.
390, 400 (1993) ("Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been
held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation
occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding.").
39 Thomas Ill et al., supra note 31, at 277 (suggesting that cases involving guilty pleas by the
defendant are generally least deserving of post-conviction claims of innocence).
40 Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME &
JUST. 283, 293 (2003) (citing a series of simulated trials done by researchers, where it was found that
"[in these simulated trials, people are more accepting of verdicts that resulted from fair trial
procedures, independent of the favorableness or fairness of those verdicts"); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S.
570, 579 (1986) ("[I]f the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a
strong presumption that any other errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-error
analysis. The thrust of the many constitutional rules governing the conduct of criminal trials is to
ensure that those trials lead to fair and correct judgments. Where a reviewing court can find that the
record developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the interest in fairness has been
satisfied and the judgment should be affirmed. As we have repeatedly stated, 'the Constitution
entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one."') (citations omitted).
41 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) ("[I]f the settled procedural prerequisites for
such a claim have otherwise been satisfied[,] . . . the applicant is entitled to habeas corpus relief if it
is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.").
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for that of a jury.42 Thus, in the interest of finality, it is made exceedingly difficult
for a defendant to obtain relief based on the discovery of new evidence, absent
procedural error of some kind.4 3
This presents a central philosophical question for prosecutors. Prosecutors
have a tradition, not uniformly honored, of "confessing" or correcting error when
they learn that discovery material was wrongly withheld or other procedural
violations occurred,44 but there is no established tradition guiding prosecutors'
response to newly discovered, exculpatory evidence.4 5 Prosecutors may approach
claims of innocence with great skepticism and resist them strenuously on the
theory that the principles of finality underlying the legal impediments to post-
conviction relief should similarly influence prosecutors' own attitude toward post-
trial innocence claims.46  Doing so would discourage unworthy post-conviction
claims and minimize incentives for criminal defendants or their compatriots to
manufacture false exculpatory evidence or to intimidate trial witnesses to secure
recantations. 47 Opposing post-conviction innocence claims would also conserve
42 See, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995) ("It is not the district court's
independent judgment as to whether reasonable doubt exists that the standard addresses; rather the
standard requires the district court to make a probabilistic determination about what reasonable,
properly instructed jurors would do.").
43 See Thomas I et al., supra note 31, at 277-88 (discussing federal and state time
limitations on claims of innocence imposed primarily in the interest of finality).
44 See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959) (failure of prosecutor to correct false
statement of witness that he did not receive anything in exchange for his testimony was a violation of
defendant's due process right); United States v. Alli, 344 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 2003) (prosecutor
must take steps to correct known false statements even if the defense counsel knew them to be false
and tried to expose this fact to the jury); Northern Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir.
2001) (prosecutor's duty requires him to act when put on notice of the "real possibility of false
testimony") (citing Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-70, 79).
45 See Goldberg & Siegel, supra note 33, at 406-09 ("Although innocence-based claims for
postconviction testing appear to implicate [action by a prosecutor], such claims do not readily
implicate existing legal obligations, either for disclosure by prosecutors or access to evidence by
defendants.").
46 See Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind: Factual Innocence
and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 547, 563 (2002) (questioning the overemphasis
prosecutors place on finality); Zacharias, supra note 34, at 175, 212-13 (stating that a prosecutor's
propensity for a certain post-conviction standard may be influenced by principles of finality); Tafero
v. State, 406 So. 2d 89, 94 n.l 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("[T]he fact that the state agrees that a
conviction should be set aside because of newly discovered evidence neither prevents the entry of the
original judgment nor fosters the rule of finality.").
47 See Toney v. Gammon, 79 F.3d 693, 700 (8th Cir. 1996) (reviewing prosecutors'
opposition to post-conviction DNA testing ordered in a federal habeas case because "granting the
motion 'would open the flood gates for DNA testing'); Myrna S. Raeder, See No Evil: Wrongful
Convictions and the Prosecutorial Ethics of Offering Testimony by Jailhouse Informants and
Dishonest Experts, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 1413, 1419-20 (2007) (Prisoners become informants not
only when requested to but by alleging that they have information on anyone that might be of value.);
Zacharias, supra note 34, at 215-16 (arguing that prosecutors may resist claims of innocence to avoid
opening the floodgates to constant requests from defendants); Brooke A. Masters, 2 Conservative
Jurists Back DNA Testing, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2002, at A7 ("Joshua Marquis, an Oregon
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48police, prosecutorial and judicial resources, minimize the burden on witnesses
and victims, 49 and potentially discourage public second-guessing and promote
public confidence in the reliability of the criminal process.50  Alternatively,
prosecutors may take the view that, given the proven fallibility of the criminal
process and the public aversion to wrongful punishment, they should play a
vigorous role in uprooting and correcting factual error.5' Doing so might be
thought to counterbalance and legitimize legal impediments to post-conviction
relief for factually innocent defendants.
Of course, there is not always a clear distinction between claims of innocence
and claims of legally cognizable procedural error. New information may suggest
both that the defendant is factually innocent and that the proceeding was legally
defective. For example, evidence that a jailhouse informant testified falsely will be
exculpatory, but it may also provide a legal ground for challenging the
prosecutor and board member of the National District Attorneys Association, warned that inmates
would abuse a blanket rule on DNA testing."); Richard A. Oppel Jr., States Move Toward Easing
Obstacles to DNA Testing, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2000, at A8 (statement of Richard E. Trodden,
president of the Virginia Association of Commonwealth Attorney that prosecutors would want any
law on post-conviction DNA requests to be written "as narrowly as possible, so we just don't open
the floodgates.").
48 See Jenner v. Dooley, 590 N.W.2d 463, 471 (S.D. 1999) (DNA testing should be granted
where it would not impose an unreasonable burden on the state); Medwed, Zeal Deal, supra note 32,
at 157-58 (prosecutors may oppose post-conviction innocence claims because if the wrongfully
convicted defendant is exonerated, the state may be required to compensate him or her and
inadvertently draw from the prosecutor's funds in doing so); Thomas II et al., supra note 31, at 295-
99 (detailing efficiency calculations based on a standard used by Judge Richard Posner).
49 Goldberg & Siegel, supra note 33, at 409 ("[V]ictims of violent crime seek finality as a
way of promoting closure. A defendant's postconviction request for scientific tests threatens to
undermine [this] finality, which adds to the resistance to such testing."); David Meier, The
Prosecution's Perspective on Post-Conviction Relief in Light of DNA Technology and Newly
Discovered Evidence, 35 NEW ENG. L. Rnv. 657, 659-60 (2001) (discussing the hardship of going to
the victim's family after they thought justice was done and telling them that the wrong man may have
been convicted).
50 See Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 46, at 563 ("[T]o the extent that DNA exonerations
reveal systemic flaws in the criminal justice system ... some prosecutors may believe that
exonerations undermine the credibility of the system."); Zacharias, supra note 34, at 227 (stating that
prosecutors may believe that post-conviction claims may undermine public confidence in the
prosecutor's office, hamper public cooperation and impact relationships with law enforcement
investigations); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline
Seriously, 8 D.C. L. RFV. 275, 299 (2004) ("Wrongful conviction cases have decreased public
confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice system, and, to the extent that police and
prosecutors are responsible for wrongful convictions, in those government offices.").
51 Jodi Wilgoren, Prosecutors Use DNA Test to Clear Man in '85 Rape, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
2002, at A22 (Susan Gaertner, the chief prosecutor in St. Paul where a man was cleared through
DNA testing, explained that "[t]he major reason we undertook this review is because of the attack on
prosecutors and the criminal justice system lately[.]... I'm afraid that it's left an impression with the
public that all we care about is convictions, and not justice.").
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conviction.52 Likewise, the discovery of a credible alibi witness who could easily
have been located by the defense lawyer will suggest the possibility that the
conviction was factually erroneous and that the defendant was deprived of
effective assistance of counsel.53 But the discovery of new exculpatory evidence
does not invariably imply that the trial was procedurally defective. For example,
the defendant may be convicted based on the testimony of eyewitnesses who are
certain of their identifications but nevertheless wrong.54 In this example, the
innocent defendant would have no valid post-conviction claim that the trial was
unfair, but new evidence may nevertheless establish that he did not commit the
crime in question.
Doubts about a convicted defendant's guilt may arise in any number of ways.
The public has now grown accustomed to doubts raised by the results of DNA tests
of evidence from old cases. In some rape cases, for example, DNA testing may
establish with a high degree of certainty that the defendant was innocent because it
is agreed that there was only one assailant and the test shows that he was not the
defendant.55  In other cases, DNA testing may raise questions about the
defendant's guilt but not be conclusive.56 Prosecutors generally accept the
52 See Raeder, supra note 47, at 1413-14 ("In these due process claims [involving jailhouse
informants], defendants generally allege that the prosecutors knowingly introduced false or perjurious
testimony, did not correct the testimony when its falsity was discovered, or failed to disclose
exculpatory Brady material that would have contradicted the mendacious witness.").
53 Glover v. Miro, 262 F.3d 268, 278-79 (4th Cir. 2001) (ineffective assistance because
counsel failed to contact potential alibi witnesses); Griffin v. Warden, Md. Corr. Adjustment Ctr.,
970 F.2d 1355, 1358 (4th Cir. 1992) (counsel's failure to call alibi witnesses was ineffective
assistance because counsel's reliance on plea bargain was not rational).
54 False certainty is a well-documented problem. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 205 N.W.2d
461, 483 (Mich. 1973) (The defendant spent 375 days in prison for another man's crime. Dimples
Anderson, the victim, gave mistaken eyewitness testimony convicting the defendant. The defense
attorney asked Anderson, "It's possible that you could have made a mistake today?" To which he
replied, "No."); Noah Clements, Flipping a Coin: A Solution for the Inherent Unreliability of
Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 40 IND. L. REv. 271 (2007) (stating that most studies show that
mistaken identification is the leading cause of unjust convictions in the United States); Sandra Guerra
Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Uncorroborated Eyewitness Identification
Testimony, 41 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1487, 1489-90 (2008) (reviewing overwhelming scientific
evidence of faulty eyewitness identifications); Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic
Reforms, 2006 WIS. L. REv. 615, 620 (2006) (discussing witness certainty and faulty eyewitness
identification procedures).
55 See Cynthia Bryant, When One Man's DNA is Another Man's Exonerating Evidence:
Compelling Consensual Sexual Partners of Rape Victims to Provide DNA Samples to Postconviction
Petitioners, 33 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 113, 119-21 (2000) (stating that tests that exclude a
suspect are generally not controversial); Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
55 (2008) (examining causes of wrongful convictions in empirical study of DNA based
exonerations); see generally Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Innocence Project, The Causes of
Wrongful Conviction, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
56 See Bryant, supra note 55, at 117-22 (the weight of testing that is inclusive of a suspect is
often contested, i.e. when the sample from the crime scene is consistent with the sample from the
defendant); see also Anna Franceschelli, Motions for Postconviction DNA Testing: Determining the
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reliability of the test results, but they do not necessarily agree on the significance
of the results.57
Many other kinds of new information may also raise doubts about the
reliability of convictions, even though prosecutors are unlikely to accord the
information as much respect as DNA test results.58 Prosecution witnesses recant.59
New eyewitnesses or informants come forward who exonerate the defendant and
implicate someone else. 60  New scientific understandings cast doubt on the
credibility of forensic evidence used at trial 61 -e.g., new questions have been
raised about the reliability of bite mark evidence 62 and lead bullet analysis. 63 New
Standard of Proof Necessary in Granting Requests, 31 CAP. U. L. REv. 243, 264 (2003) (inconclusive
results might be of no legal significance).
57 See Adam Liptak, Prosecutors Fight DNA Use for Exoneration, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29,
2003, at Al ("Prosecutors acknowledge that DNA testing is reliable, but they have grown
increasingly skeptical of its power to prove innocence in cases where there was other evidence of
guilt."); see also Franceschelli, supra note 56, at 263-64 (The significance of inclusive results might
be contested depending on the defendant's contention on appeal, it may be the case where the theory
is not that the defendant's DNA should be missing, but rather that the crime was not committed.
Further, the significance of exclusive results might be contested if the prosecution adopts a theory
that while the defendant may not have left DNA on a victim, he was nevertheless a participant in the
crime.).
58 See Medwed, Zeal Deal, supra note 32, at 131-32 ("Notably, non-DNA cases are much
harder for defendants to overturn through post-conviction proceedings because of the absence of a
method to prove innocence to a scientific certainty.").
59 See, e.g., Shawn Armbrust, Reevaluating Recanting Witnesses: Why the Red-Headed
Stepchild of New Evidence Deserves Another Look, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 75 (2008) (citing
cases of recanting witnesses and arguing that witness recantations should be supported by
corroborating witness in claims of innocence); see also Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law, Center on
Wrongful Convictions, Meet the Exonerated,
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvicfions/exonerations/alMcMillianSummary.html (last
visited Jan. 20, 2009) (Walter McMillian was sentenced to death for the murder of a store clerk but
was later exonerated when three witnesses came forward to say that they had lied at trial.) and
Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law, supra at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/flJentSummary.htm (last visited
Jan. 20, 2009) (William Jent & Ernest Miller were convicted of rape and murder, only to be
exonerated when a witness testified that he had been coerced by a local sheriff to give false
testimony.).
60 See, e.g., Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law, supra note 59, at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/caBigelowSummary.htm (Jerry
Bigelow was convicted of murder, robbery and kidnapping due to the testimony of a companion, but
witnesses later came forward to say that the companion had confessed to them that he was the one
who committed the crimes.) (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
61 Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second
Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CAL. L. REv. 721, 724 (2007) ("In recent years, empirical
studies and select trial courts have called into question the legitimacy of evidentiary stalwarts like
handwriting, voice exemplars, hair and fiber, bite and tool marks, and even fingerprints.").
62 Paul C. Giannelli & Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutors, Ethics, and Expert Witnesses, 76
FoRDnAM L. REv. 1493, 1501-06 (2007) (describing the erroneous bite-mark testimony given by Dr.
Michael West); Allen P. Wilkinson & Ronald M. Gerughty, Bite Mark Evidence: Its Admissibility Is
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information casts doubt on the reliability of particular testimony or evidence at the
defendant's trial. For example, evidence that a jailhouse informant,64 accomplice
witness, 65 police officer66 or expert witness67 lied in a different case may raise
questions about whether the same witness was truthful in the defendant's case. A
new forensic technique may suggest that previously untested crime-scene evidence
is exculpatory.
68
These situations raise the question of how the prosecutor should respond upon
learning of evidence or information that casts doubt on a conviction's reliability-
or even whether prosecutors should pro-actively make some efforts to learn about
such information, rather than simply reacting to its arrival. 69  When should
Hard to Swallow, 12 W. ST. U. L. REv. 519, 537 (1985) (questioning the reliability of bite mark
analysis).
63 William A. Tobin & Wayne Duerfeldt, How Probative Is Comparative Bullet Lead
Analysis?, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2002, at 26, 33 ("We believe that the current practice of CBLA is
scientifically flawed, and that no scientifically or statistically adequate data exist to support its
foundation.").
64 See Paul C. Giannelli, Brady and Jailhouse Snitches, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 593, 596-97
(2007) (A prisoner, Leslie Vernon White, admitted to fabricating a great number of alleged
confessions and having engaged in multiple acts of perjury. A grand jury investigating Mr. White's
testimony found that the District Attorney's Office "'failed to fulfill the ethical responsibilities
required of a public prosecutor by its deliberate and informed declination to take the action necessary
to curtail the misuse of jail house informant testimony."').
65 Christine J. Saverda, Accomplices in Federal Court: A Case for Increased Evidentiary
Standards, 100 YALE L.J. 785 (1990) (arguing for reform of accomplice testimony by requiring
corroboration).
66 Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L.
RaV. 1037, 1046-47 (1996) (referencing a study done by Myron Orfield in Chicago finding that
"52% [of the prosecutors, judges and police officers surveyed] believed that at least 'half of the time'
the prosecutor 'knows or has reason to know' that police fabricate evidence at suppression hearings,
and 93%, including 89% of the prosecutors, stated that prosecutors had such knowledge of perjury 'at
least some of the time.' Sixty-one percent, including 50% of the state's attorneys, believed that
prosecutors know or have reason to know that police fabricate evidence in case reports, and 50% of
the prosecutors believed the same with respect to warrants .... ).
67 See, e.g., Raeder, supra note 47, at 1421 (describing the story of Joyce Gilchrist, a forensic
chemist, whose multiple incorrect hair analyses was discovered through later DNA testing. It later
surfaced that Gilchrist had knowingly lied while testifying.); Giannelli & McMunigal, supra note 62
(citing numerous cases of false expert testimony).
68 See Murphy, supra note 61, at 723 ("But currently on the horizon are a new generation of
forensic sciences capable of uncovering and inculpating criminal offenders at an order of magnitude
greater than that afforded by traditional forensic techniques. This array of exciting new methods-
such as DNA typing, data mining, location tracking, and biometric technologies-represents a
marked advance over the rudimentary techniques of old, and will surely stake a central and
indispensable role in the future administration of criminal justice."); Findley, supra note 31 (arguing
that adversarial adjudication of forensic science places defendants at risk of wrongful convictions and
disproportionately favor the prosecution over the defendant and calling for institutionalized oversight
by scientists).
69 Some prosecutors' offices proactively initiate reviews of cases where DNA is available.
See Medwed, Zeal Deal, supra note 32, at 126 nn.3-4; Susan Gaertner, Driving Home Prosecutors'
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prosecutors disclose their information to the defendant, defense counsel (if the
defendant is represented), the court, or other law enforcement authorities? To what
extent, and in what manner, should prosecutors investigate or ask others to
investigate? Is it sufficient simply to assess the credibility of the new evidence or
must the original trial evidence be reexamined? When, and in what manner,
should prosecutors seek to secure the release of convicted defendants in light of
credible new evidence of innocence, and when, and by what means, should
prosecutors oppose defendants' efforts to overturn their convictions or secure
clemency?
These situations also raise the question of how prosecutors' offices in general
should be structured to address the problem of factually erroneous convictions.
Should prosecutors assign investigative responsibility to the original trial
prosecutor (if he or she is available), on the theory that the trial prosecutor best
knows the trial evidence and the investigation that produced it and will therefore
be best equipped to evaluate the credibility of the new information in the context of
the overall evidence? That is evidently what the district attorney's office initially
did in the Palladium case. 70 Or, as later occurred in that case, should the office
assign a new prosecutor who was uninvolved in the original trial to make a fresh
and unbiased review more likely? 7' Indeed, should district attorneys create special
units staffed by such lawyers72 or advocate for the legislature or the judiciary to
create independent commissions? To what extent should thoughts on these
questions be informed by the experience in other countries and what does that
experience teach US? 73 To what extent should the thinking be informed by social
science literature on cognitive bias?7
4
Commitment to Justice, A.B.A CRIM. JUST. SEC. NEWSL., Spring 2008, at 6 (Minnesota prosecutor
initiates systemic DNA review).
70 Dateline NBC: In the Shadow of Justice, supra note 2 (chronicling Bronx detectives'
frustration at the district attorney's office's initial apparent indifference into their investigation into
whether Lemus and Hidalgo were wrongly convicted of the Palladium murder).
71 See Weiser, supra note 1 ("Over 21 months, starting in 2003, [Daniel Bibb] and two
detectives conducted more than 50 interviews in more than a dozen states, ferreting out witnesses the
police had somehow missed or ignored.").
72 See Moreno, infra note 76 and accompanying text; Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in
Criminal Law, 95 CAL. L. REv. 383, 437 (2007) (In North Carolina, "[a] new law created a
supplementary North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission, with an eight-member panel that
reviews criminal post-conviction cases raising indicia of innocence.").
73 See, e.g., Lissa Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative
Perspective, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1241, 1268-70 (2001) (In England, "[i]f leave to appeal is
granted, the standard for reversal on appeal is whether the court of appeal believes the conviction is
'unsafe.' An 'unsafe' conviction is one in which the court entertains a 'lurking doubt' that the
defendant was rightly convicted, i.e., one in which the court is not 'sure' that the defendant was
'rightly convicted."' Further, the court may grant requests considering newly discovered evidence
when the court "'think[s] it necessary or expedient in the interests of justice' to do so."); id. at 1276
(In Canada, the Criminal Cases Review Commission "review[s] the applications of convicted
defendants who claim they have been wrongfully convicted and ... refer[s] cases to the court of
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It is virtually impossible to know how federal and state prosecutors across the
United States currently deal with these questions. Certainly, there have been many
reported cases in which prosecutors learned of new evidence, investigated or failed
to investigate, and made or opposed efforts to secure the defendant's release.75 At
least one prosecutor, Dallas district attorney Craig Watkins, has established a unit
to reexamine cases in which wrongful convictions may have been obtained before
he took office.76 But because prosecutors' internal processes are not transparent,
very little is known about the internal deliberations and rationales for what
prosecutors have done.77 After the Palladium case, for example, neither the former
senior prosecutor nor his former office would publicly disclose the details of the
office's internal deliberations. 78
How prosecutors respond is not entirely a matter of discretion. There is
authority suggesting that, as an ethical or constitutional matter, prosecutors
sometimes have a post-conviction obligation to disclose new exculpatory evidence.
For example, the United States Supreme Court stated in Imbler v. Pachtman79 that
prosecutors are "bound by the ethics of [their] office to inform the appropriate
authority of after-acquired or other information that casts doubt upon the
correctness of the conviction." 80 Additionally, the ABA recently adopted Rules
3.8(g) and (h) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which, if eventually
adopted by state courts, would constrain prosecutors' discretion. In essence, Rule
3.8(g) requires prosecutors to disclose and investigate new exculpatory evidence
when it is material and credible, 81 while Rule 3.8(h) requires them to try to
overturn or otherwise rectify the conviction when they know of "clear and
convincing" evidence that the defendant was in fact innocent.82 These provisions
are meant to establish the disciplinary minimum, not to fully elaborate the
appeal for review where there is a 'real possibility that the conviction, verdict, finding or sentence
would not be upheld were the reference to be made."').
74 See sources cited supra note 32.
75 See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice "?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607,
638 (1999) (In the case of Jeffrey Blake, after conviction an original witness recanted, and a new
witness came forward in support of Blake, but his motion for a new trial was still opposed by
prosecutors at first; however the office later joined in the motion.); Houston v. Partee, 978 F.2d 362,
364 (7th Cir. 1992) (prosecutors opposed motions of wrongly convicted plaintiffs after substantial
exculpatory evidence surfaced); Boemer, supra note 22, at 1987 ("Moreover, it's not only the courts
that can procedurally bar a defendant's right to post-conviction DNA testing, but prosecutors as
well.").
76 Sylvia Moreno, New Prosecutor Revisits Justice in Dallas, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2007, at
A4; see infra text accompanying notes 168-77.
77 See supra notes 20 & 25 and accompanying text.
78 See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
79 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
go Id. at 427 n.25.
81 See supra note 26.
82 See supra note 27.
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professional expectations for prosecutors.8 3 They do not prescribe how to respond
when the credibility of new evidence has yet to be evaluated. They leave
prosecutors substantial discretion to decide how to investigate new evidence. 84
And they do not prescribe how to act when, at the end of an investigation, serious
doubts have been raised, but the defendant's innocence has not been clearly and
convincingly established. At present, prosecutors cannot find much additional
guidance in other sources such as the ABA Standards of Criminal Justice8 5 or the
National District Attorneys' Association standards.
8 6
B. Legal and Procedural Background
It is important to take account of the legal and procedural background against
which prosecutors act when they make discretionary decisions in response to new
post-conviction evidence of innocence. What is most striking is the contrast pre-
conviction and post-conviction in the law's attitude toward the risk of erroneous
convictions. 87 At trial, the prosecution has the burden of proving guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, and the defendant's rights to counsel, trial by jury, compulsory
process, and cross-examination, among others, are similarly intended to minimize
the risk that an innocent defendant will be punished.8 In contrast, once a
defendant is convicted after a fair trial, there is a strong presumption of the
defendant's factual guilt, which may be impossible to overcome through the
judicial process, 89 despite our knowledge that trials are fallible.90
83 See supra note 28.
" See supra note 29.
85 A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 4-8.5 (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE] ("[T]he
responsibility of a lawyer in a post-conviction proceeding should be guided generally by the
standards governing the conduct of lawyers in criminal cases.").
86 See NAT'L DIST. ATrORNEYS Ass'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS §§ 87-91 (2d ed.
1991) available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/ndaa-natl-prosecution-standards_2.pdf (containing no
discussion of post-conviction claims).
87 See Goldberg & Siegel, supra note 33, at 410 ("The postconviction phase of a criminal case
presents an effective role-reversal for the respective parties. The presumptions and burdens are the
reverse of those in the investigative and trial phases of a case ....").
88 See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986) ("Without these basic protections, a
criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence.").
But see Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 95 (1996)
(proposing that jury trials hide the truth more than they discover it); Findley, Innocents at Risk, supra
note 31 (arguing that procedural and evidentiary rules skew the system toward substantial risk of
error of convicting the innocent).
89 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399 (1993) ("Once a defendant has been afforded a
fair trial and convicted of the offense for which he was charged, the presumption of innocence
disappears."); see also Goldberg & Siegel, supra note 33, at 410 ("In the postconviction context...
[tihe defendant bears the burden of proof, and all presumptions favor the government."); Zacharias,
supra note 34, at 210 ("Once a defendant has been tried and has exhausted his appeals, the criminal
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Some may find it surprising, but there is no federal constitutional right to be
released from incarceration based on factual innocence standing alone. In Herrera
v. Collins,91 the Supreme Court recognized that the traditional remedy for
miscarriages of justice is executive clemency, not judicial redress.92 Courts have
no inherent ability to free the innocent. In many states and federally, absent
procedural error,93 clemency is the exclusive remedy when newly discovered
evidence establishes the convicted defendant's innocence. 94 In these jurisdictions,
rectifying convictions of innocent individuals is a purely executive function with
ultimate authority vested in the Governor (or, in federal cases, the President).
95
Even if a convicted defendant could convince the court of his innocence beyond all
doubt, and the prosecutor agreed, the court's hands would be legally tied (absent
recourse to subterfuge).96
justice system is prepared to assume both that the defendant received fair process and that the process
resulted in an accurate judgment.").
90 Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 173, 175-76 (2008)
(discussing DNA exonerations in the past 30 years); see sources cited supra note 55.
91 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
92 Id. at 416-17. The Supreme Court stated:
Federal habeas review of state convictions has traditionally been limited to claims of
constitutional violations occurring in the course of the underlying state criminal
proceedings. Our federal habeas cases have treated claims of 'actual innocence,' not as
an independent constitutional claim, but as a basis upon which a habeas petitioner may
have an independent constitutional claim considered on the merits, even though his
habeas petition would otherwise be regarded as successive or abusive. History shows
that the traditional remedy for claims of innocence based on new evidence, discovered
too late in the day to file a new trial motion, has been executive clemency.
Id.
93 See, e.g., Moeller v. Weber, 689 N.W.2d 1, 7 (S.D. 2004) (noting that "newly discovered
evidence is not a sufficient ground for habeas relief where no deprivation of a constitutionally
protected right is involved"); Bruce v. Smith, 553 S.E.2d 808 (Ga. 2001) (indicating that their state
habeas corpus statute provides relief only for a substantial denial of constitutional right under the
U.S. Constitution or the Georgia Constitution).
94 LARRY W. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 7 (Thomson West 2008) (citing the
availability of "remedies in thirty-five states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico"); Brandon L.
Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629 (2008) (discussing availability of state and
federal judicial remedies for innocence claims); Margaret Colgate Love, Reviving the Benign
Prerogative of Pardoning, LrrG., Winter 2006, at 25, 26 ("Pardons are granted on more than a token
basis in only 13 states and are a realistically available remedy in only about half of those.").
95 The clemency power of the President stems from Article II, Section 2 of the United States
Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President... shall have Power to grant Reprieves
and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment."). State
clemency procedures come in a variety of forms. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Essay, The Ascent of
the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARv. L. REV. 1332, 1350 (2008) (outlining
that some states vest the authority solely in the governor, about two-thirds of states use an
administrative board that provides the governor with advice or make decisions along with the
governor, while five states vest the authority solely in a board).
96 See Sara Rodriguez & Scott J. Atlas, Habeas Corpus: The Dilemma of Actual Innocence,
LTG., Winter 2008, at 35; see also supra text accompanying note 89.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LA W
Most states afford a judicial remedy of one kind or another97 at least when
exculpatory evidence is "newly discovered" and sufficiently reliable. 8 Several
provide for judicial relief only when the convicted defendant is exonerated by
DNA evidence, 99 but most make the remedy more broadly available. What must
be proven varies. Some adjudications focus on whether new evidence would have
raised a sufficiently serious doubt at trial.1°° In New York, for example, the
convicted defendant must present newly discovered evidence "of such character as
to create a probability that had such evidence been received at the trial the verdict
would have been more favorable to the defendant ... ."'0' A judicial finding that
the standard was met does not logically preclude a retrial. In other states, the
defendant must show sufficiently compelling proof of innocence, in which event a
retrial would presumably be foreclosed. In Texas, for example, "the applicant
bears the burden of showing that the newly discovered evidence unquestionably
establishes his or her innocence." 10 2  Elsewhere, the convicted defendant must
97 See YACKLE, supra note 94, § 13 (giving an overview of the various state post-conviction
procedures).
98 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (a federal hearing is required if there is a
substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence that could not reasonably have been introduced in
state court); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995) ("To be credible, such a claim requires
petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence-whether it be
exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence-that
was not presented at trial."); STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY 1612 (7th ed. 2004) (stating that in most jurisdictions, for a
motion for a new trial to be considered, the newly discovered evidence must have been discovered
after trial, could not have been discovered earlier with due diligence, is material and not merely
cumulative or impeaching and would likely produce an acquittal).
99 See DONALD E. WtLKES, JR., STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF HANDBOOK
WITH FORMS 7 (2008) (Ohio and Louisiana have legislated remedies when it comes to newly
discovered evidence in felony cases but only when DNA tests administered under the state's post-
conviction review statute establishes innocence by a clear and convincing evidence standard.).
100 See, e.g., Downes v. State, 771 A.2d 289, 291 (Del. 2001) ("[T]o be successful on a new
trial application the defendant must establish.., that the evidence is such as will probably change the
result if a new trial is granted .... "); Bean v. State, 858 P.2d 327, 330 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) ("[T]he
proper test for determining a motion for new trial based upon recanted testimony 'is not whether the
recantation of testimony probably would produce an acquittal; it is whether the recantation
reasonably could affect the outcome."') (citations omitted); Taylor v. State, 840 N.E.2d 324, 329-30
(Ind. 2006) (writing that "[n]ew evidence will mandate a new trial only when the defendant
demonstrates that ... it will probably produce a different result at retrial") (citation omitted); Reise v.
State, 913 A.2d 1052, 1056 (R.I. 2007) ("When conducting the analysis of an application for
postconviction relief based on newly discovered evidence ..... the applicant must establish that...
the evidence is of a kind which would probably change the verdict at trial."); Clark v. State, 434
S.E.2d 266, 267 (S.C. 1993) ("To obtain a new trial based on after discovered evidence, the party
must show that the evidence.., would probably change the result if a new trial is had ....
101 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(g) (McKinney 2005).
102 Exparte Thompson, 153 S.W.3d 416, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citation omitted).
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establish his innocence by clear and convincing evidence.10 3 Even where a judicial
remedy is otherwise afforded, time restrictions or other restrictions may make it
unavailable to a particular defendant. 104
Executive clemency, although generally available, 0 5 is rarely granted.' ° 6
Governors hesitate to second-guess the results of the criminal process.l17 There are
many possible explanations. Governors may doubt their own ability to make a
sufficiently reliable determination of innocence. 08  They may fear undermining
103 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §12.72.020(b)(2)(D) (2008) (dictating that newly discovered
evidence must "establish[] by clear and convincing evidence that the applicant is innocent"); D.C.
CODE § 22-4135(g)(3) (2008) (dictating that if the movant shows his innocence "by clear and
convincing evidence ... the court shall vacate the conviction and dismiss the relevant count with
prejudice"); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/122-1(a)(2) (West 2004) (In 2003 the State Legislature
amended the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act to authorize relief if "the death penalty was
imposed and there is newly discovered evidence... that establishes a substantial basis to believe that
the defendant is actually innocent by clear and convincing evidence.").
104 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 (three year time limit for motions based on newly discovered
evidence). Most states dictate that a case will not be reviewed for executive clemency if appellate
proceedings are not yet concluded and there are other avenues for the incarcerated defendant still
available. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 992 F.2d 801, 803 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that "cases involving
state competency and clemency proceedings ... frequently are not commenced until state and federal
postconviction relief have been denied and an execution date has been set."); In re Lindsey, 875 F.2d
1502, 1507 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (allowing a clemency petition to proceed before the exhaustion of state
court remedies would upset "the proper sequence, developed from concerns for federalism, for
seeking collateral relief from state-court judgments in death-penalty cases"). See also Boemer, supra
note 22, at 1980 (discussing the pitfalls to newly discovered evidence from time limits on the motion
for such evidence); Clifford Dome & Kenneth Gewerth, Mercy in a Climate of Retributive Justice:
Interpretations from a National Survey of Executive Clemency Procedures, 25 NEw ENG. J. ON CRM.
& Civ. CONFINEMENT 413, 433, 437 (1999) (pointing to some states which have restrictions on types
of offenses that are ineligible for pardons).
105 See Elizabeth Rapaport, Straight Is the Gate: Capital Clemency in the United States from
Gregg to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REv. 349, 350 (2003) ("Although there are considerable variations in the
clemency procedures of the states, the majority of states follow the federal model, vesting clemency
power in the governor.").
'06 See Barkow, supra note 95, at 1348 ("At both the state and federal level, grants of
executive clemency have plummeted in recent decades."); Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without a
Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIz.
L. REv. 655, 717 (2005) ("[T]he executive clemency power-an oft-cited, purported panacea for the
ills of wrongful convictions-is seldom exercised by government officials.").
107 See James D. Barnett, The Grounds of Pardon, 17 J. AM. INST. CRtI. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
490, 500 (1927) (As Governor Pierce of Oregon stated in the 1920s: "It is the function of the courts
to pass upon a man's guilt or innocence. It is not the function of the executive to again try the case
before the convicted man has reached the penitentiary.... I do not propose to usurp the power of the
courts by becoming a trial judge.").
108 See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARv. L. REv. 355, 435 (1995)
(Governors are reluctant to grant pardons because they may "feel that any sentence that survives both
state and federal review is not an appropriate vehicle for exercising the power of clemency" because
these processes are safeguards and affirmations of a correct conviction.).
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public confidence in the criminal justice process. 1°9 Or they may fear that they will
pardon a convict who will commit another crime upon release.11° Most obviously,
political interests militate against granting pardons based on innocence, at least in
the absence of countervailing media pressure."' Releasing convicted defendants is
rarely a route to political popularity.
It is up to the executive to decide how persuasive the case of innocence must
be to justify a pardon. New York State's Division of Parole website suggests that
clemency is an option when "there is overwhelming and convincing proof of
innocence not available at the time of conviction .... ,,112 Similarly, Minnesota's
guidelines hold that one should not even apply for executive clemency unless there
is "some new information that the court did not consider or which makes your case
unusual or extraordinary."'1 13 These pronouncements are in no way binding on the
state governors, but they do suggest the extent of the challenge facing a defendant
seeking clemency based on actual innocence.
Prosecutors have a pivotal role with respect to motions to set aside
convictions in states where judicial relief is available as well as with respect to
executive clemency determinations.1 14 A court is more likely to grant relief if the
prosecutor joins in a defendant's motion to set aside his conviction based on new
109 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 95, at 1354 n.101 (theorizing that executives face criticism
for pardons because the "decision often amounts to second-guessing of a jury's verdict or a
prosecutor's decision to seek a plea .... "); Yaroshefsky, supra note 50, at 299.
110 See Barkow, supra note 95, at 1349.
111 See Medwed, supra note 106, at 717 ("Even when used, clemency may be aimed chiefly
toward attaining political objectives, with any correction of injustice as a side effect."). See also
MARTIN YANT, PRESUMED GUILTY: WHEN INNOCENT PEOPLE ARE WRONGLY CONVICTED 16-17
(1991) (noting that it took articles in the Dallas Times Herald, the New York Times and a 60 Minutes
segment before the Texas Governor took a good look at the case and eventually released Lenell
Geter); Robert Hardaway, Beyond a Conceivable Doubt: The Quest for a Fair and Constitutional
Standard of Proof in Death Penalty Cases, 34 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 221, 264
(2008) ("Of the clemencies granted in favor of a defendant in the past twenty years, many were
granted by governors as they were leaving office."); Sam Howe Verhovek, Gov. Bush Denies Pardon
in Rape Case, Despite DNA, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1997, at 23 ("A lawyer for the convicted man has
accused the Governor, a potential Presidential aspirant, of bending to concerns over the political
fallout of pardoning a convicted rapist .... ").
112 New York State Division of Parole, Program & Resources: Restoration of Rights,
Executive Clemency, https://parole.state.ny.us/Clemency.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
113 Criminal Justice Policy Foundation, Clemency Policy, Minnesota,
http://www.cjpf.org/clemency/Minnesota.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
114 After appeals are complete:
[T[he prosecutor may be the only participant in the criminal justice system in a position
to rectify a wrong. Information suggesting or probative of a wrong often is in the
prosecutor's exclusive possession. The prosecutor also may be the only person with the
power to act, either because the requisite resources are subject to the prosecutor's domain
or because statutes delegate the right to reopen matters to prosecutorial discretion.
Zacharias, supra note 34, at 175. See also Goldberg & Siegel, supra note 33, at 406-07 (discussing
how prosecutors generally have in their possession many of the tools, and information, necessary for
convicted innocents to obtain post-conviction relief).
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evidence.' 15 Indeed, where such relief is unavailable based on factual innocence, a
court might grant relief based on purported procedural error, thereby avoiding the
need for executive clemency, if the defendant has a colorable claim of procedural
error and a sympathetic prosecutor does not oppose the claim. 116 Likewise, an
executive would be most likely (although perhaps still unlikely) to issue a pardon
if the prosecutor supports the application. 117 Conversely, it would be exceedingly
difficult to prevail over the prosecutor's opposition either in court or in the
executive mansion."18
C. Institutional Approaches to Investigating and Evaluating Post-Conviction
Evidence of Innocence
In the United States, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to evaluate,
investigate, and respond to new exculpatory evidence following a conviction is
generally entrusted to the prosecutor's office in the jurisdiction in which the
conviction was obtained. That raises the unavoidable problem of cognitive bias.
There is a significant body of social science literature about how human judgment
115 See, e.g., Medwed, Zeal Deal, supra note 32, at 132 ("[T]he reaction of prosecutors to post-
conviction innocence claims has had and will continue to have a great bearing on whether actually
innocent prisoners receive justice."); Zacharias, supra note 34, at 187 (noting the "persuasive effect"
upon the judge of the prosecution's consent to a motion for a new trial); Bob Herbert, Justice, at
Long Last, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1998, at A31 (discussing the case of Jeffrey Blake, a convicted man
freed after Brooklyn District Attorney Charles Hynes joined in a motion to the Court to set aside the
guilty verdict).
116 See Thomas III et al., supra note 31, at 277-81. For example, in Korematsu v. United
States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984), the defendant filed a coram nobis motion in light of new
evidence of prosecutorial misconduct that had come to light many years after his conviction had been
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court and he had served his probationary term. The government did not
defend its prior conduct but asked the court instead to grant its own motion to dismiss the indictment.
The court found the government's motion to be untimely and granted the defendant's motion after
reviewing the relevant evidence and concluding that the government had misled the courts.
117 See STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 103RD CONG., INNOCENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: ASSESSING THE DANGER OF
MISTAKEN ExEcUTrONS 18 (Oct. 21, 1993) available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?%20scid=45&did=535 [hereinafter STAFF REPORT] ("In
Nebraska, Nevada and Florida, the chief state prosecutor sits on the clemency review board."). But
see Verhovek, supra note 111 (noting that Governor Bush's denial of a pardon was done over the
support for the pardon by the district attorney and the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles).
118 See, e.g., Henry Weinstein, Prosecutor Makes Case Against Clemency, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7,
2006, at B3 (the reporter quotes the district attorney's strong statements against granting clemency);
Office of Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Press Release, Governor Schwarzenegger Denies
Clemency to Convicted Murderer Michael Morales, Feb. 17, 2006, http://gov.ca.gov/press-
release/463/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2009) (detailing the governor's rejection of this clemency request);
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL STANDARDS FOR CONSIDERATION OF
CLEMENCY PETITIONS § 1-2.111 (2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/pardon/petitions.htm.
("The views of the United States Attorney are given considerable weight in determining what
recommendations the Department should make to the President.").
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is skewed by psychological biases, such as "confirmation bias", 9 and "hindsight
bias." 20 Cognitive biases account for what is popularly known as "tunnel vision,"
the human tendency to evaluate evidence through the lens of one's preexisting
expectations and conclusions.' 21  Increasingly, scholars have written about the
impact of these biases on prosecutorial and police decision making.'2 2  Tunnel
vision has had an obvious impact in the pretrial stage: having formed an initial
judgment that a particular defendant is guilty of a crime, prosecutors and police
will tend to discredit or discount the significance of new exculpatory evidence or
fit it into their preexisting theory. This tendency has played a significant role in
numerous wrongful conviction cases, 123 among the best known being the Central
Park Jogger 124 and the Duke lacrosse cases. 125 Police often focus too quickly upon
119 This is the tendency to seek and interpret information in ways that support the person's
existing beliefs, expectations, and ideas. Findley & Scott, supra note 32, at 309-16 (citations
omitted); Itiel Dror, Biased Brains, POLICE REV., June 6, 2008, at 20.
120 Also called outcome bias, this is the tendency to interpret the outcome as a confirmation
that the result was inevitable or certainly more predictable than one would initially think-i.e., the
tendency to say "I knew it all along," when one was actually unsure. Findley & Scott, supra note 32,
at 319-22.
121 Id. at 307-09 ("Psychologists analyze tunnel vision as the product of various cognitive
'biases,' such as confirmation bias, hindsight bias, and outcome bias. These cognitive biases help
explain how and why tunnel vision is so ubiquitous, even among well-meaning actors in the criminal
justice system."); Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One's Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision,
49 How. L.J. 475, 479 (2006) (discussing prosecutors and tunnel vision); Burke, Cognitive Science,
supra note 32, at 1587, 1590-91; Medwed, Preaching, supra note 32; Michael Mello, Certain Blood
for Uncertain Reasons: A Love Letter to the Vermont Legislature on Not Reinstating Capital
Punishment, 32 VT. L. REv. 765 (2008) (discussing law enforcement tunnel vision as the cause of
wrongful death penalty convictions); Donald J. Sorochan, Wrongful Convictions: Preventing
Miscarriages of Justice: Some Case Studies, 41 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 93, 103-07 (identifying tunnel
vision as the leading cause of wrongful convictions).
122 See supra notes 32 & 34.
123 For example, psychological bias has been blamed in most of the thirteen Illinois
convictions studied by the state's Commission on Capital Punishment where innocent people were
sentenced to death before being exonerated. See GEORGE H. RYAN, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 20 (2002), available at
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/comnission-report/complete-report.pdf. Likewise, the
Innocence Commission for Virginia found that tunnel vision played a significant role in many of
Virginia's thirteen wrongful convictions, and the Canadian government made a similar finding in its
official inquiries into causes of wrongful convictions. See Findley & Scott, supra note 32, at 293-95.
124 After discovering an unconscious jogger who was the victim of a brutal assault and rape in
the northern part of Central Park, the police focused upon boys whose behavior was suspicious
because they had engaged in criminal behavior elsewhere in the park that night. After many hours of
interrogation, the police obtained what were later learned to be false confessions. The boys were
convicted and not exonerated until years later, when serial rapist/killer, Matias Reyes, who was
arrested for a similar crime, came forward to claim responsibility for the Central Park Jogger assault,
and subsequent DNA testing conclusively established his responsibility. Although an investigation
by a senior prosecutor established the boys' innocence to the satisfaction of the Manhattan District
Attorney's office, which supported the defendants' motion to set aside their convictions, the police
remained unconvinced. See MICHAEL F. ARMSTRONG ET AL., REPORT TO THE POLICE COMMISSIONER
ON THE CENTRAL PARK JOGGER CASE 41 (2003), available at
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a particular suspect to the exclusion of others, and prosecutors then do the same
based on the police investigation.
26
If anything, these tendencies have an even greater impact following a
conviction, given the psychological difficulty of acknowledging one's possible role
in convicting an innocent person. 2 7 A prosecutor will tend to view a conviction as
a confirmation that his initial charging decision was correct and will naturally
discount new evidence of innocence. 128 These tendencies will be most pronounced
news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/cpjgr/nypdl2703jgrrpt.pdf (concluding "that it is more likely than not
that the defendants participated in an attack upon the jogger" after Reyes sexually assaulted her).
125 STUART TAYLOR JR. & KC JOHNSON, UNTIL PROvEN INNOCENT: POLICAL CoRREcrNEss
AND THE SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES OF THE DuKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE 55 (2007) (discussing that, in
their investigations, "[c]ops share the natural human tendency to bend new evidence to fit their
preconceived beliefs rather than adjusting their beliefs to fit the new evidence").
126 Suggestions have been made about how to minimize the impact of cognitive biases in the
criminal process. Among other things, commentators have proposed that prosecutors and police
should be trained concerning the significance of cognitive biases, that their work should be made
more transparent, that investigative techniques should be subject to reexamination and review, that
management and supervision processes should be improved, and that prosecutorial cultures should be
reformed. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Essay, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure,
81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 911 (2006) (suggesting transparency and monitoring reforms as partial solutions to
improve the criminal justice process); Burke, Invitation to Prosecutors, supra note 32, at 523-28;
Burke, Cognitive Science, supra note 32, at 1613-31; George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at
Reality, 7 Sw. U. L. REv. 98 (1975); Findley & Scott, supra note 32, at 354-96; Joel D. Lieberman &
Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations
for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 677, 703-05 (2000); Medwed, Preaching, supra, note 32; Medwed, Zeal
Deal, supra note 32, at 169-82.
127 Bandes, supra note 121, at 491 ("It is difficult to admit mistakes, and certainly difficult for
a prosecutor to accept that her actions have led to the conviction of an innocent person."); Randolph
N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor's Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 551 (1987) ("The
honorable prosecutor simply cannot believe that he is prosecuting the blameless."); Medwed, Zeal
Deal, supra note 32, at 142-43 ("When a jury verdict validates this form of 'pre-conviction' of the
defendant, it may become extremely difficult ever to establish the defendant's innocence in the eyes
of the prosecuting lawyer.").
128 See Findley & Scott, supra note 32, at 316 ("[C]ognitive biases help explain what went
wrong in many wrongful conviction cases .... Convinced by an early-although plainly flawed-
eyewitness identification, police and prosecutors.., sought evidence that would confirm guilt, not
disconfirm it."); id. at 320 ("Hindsight bias and outcome bias, together, should be expected to have
an affirmance-biasing effect in postconviction and appellate review because the outcome of the
case-conviction-tends to appear, in hindsight, to have been both inevitable and a 'good'
decision."); id. at 330 ("Trials confirm those judgments about guilt because the vast majority of trials
result in convictions."); Burke, Invitation to Prosecutors, supra note 32, at 519 ("[T]he vast majority
of cases end in conviction, either by trial or more often by guilty plea. Accordingly, prosecutors are
likely to see the end results as validation of their initial theories of guilt."). Defense lawyers do not
necessarily counterbalance these tendencies because they are also prone to tunnel vision, assuming
their clients to be guilty and often, therefore, eschewing vigorous investigation. See also F. Andrew
Hessick Ill & Reshma M. Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent: The Role of the
Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PuB. L. 189, 211 (2002); Findley &
Scott, supra note 32, at 331-33.
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for the particular prosecutors who had responsibility for investigating and trying a
case, but it will also inhere in the district attorney or other prosecutor in charge of
the office that obtained the conviction, in its supervisory prosecutors, and in others
who identify with the office and its work.
In both England 29 and Canada, 130 the impact of cognitive biases and other
concerns about wrongful convictions resulted in the establishment of independent
institutions responsible for investigating and evaluating new exculpatory evidence.
In both systems, the investigation is triggered by a convicted defendant's claim of
innocence and information to establish that claim. Thus, neither addresses the
situation (covered by the new ABA Model Rule) where the prosecutor receives
new evidence from a source other than the defendant.'
31
In England, claims of innocence are reviewed by the Criminal Cases Review
Commission ("CCRC"), 132 which decides whether to refer cases to an appellate
court to determine whether to overturn a conviction. The judicial standard for
setting aside a conviction is whether there is a "real possibility" that the conviction
is "unsafe," 133 which has been taken to mean that the court entertains a "lurking
doubt" about the correctness of the conviction. 134 The "unsafe" standard has been
construed broadly enough to lead to the reversal of convictions based on new
evidence that impeaches prosecution witnesses or on new evidence of police
129 See Criminal Cases Review Commission, How We Review Your Case,
http://www.ccrc.gov.uklcanwe/canwe_33.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2009) [hereinafter CCRC]. For a
detailed description of the English system, see Griffin, supra note 73, at 1275-92.
130 The process is set forth in a detailed government document. CANADA DEP'T OF JUST.,
APPLYING FOR A CONVICTION REvIEw, available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/ccr-rc/rev.pdf.
131 For example, in the Palladium case, new evidence came from a federal government
informant. See Tavernise, supra note 3. In the Central Park Jogger case, a defendant who had been
arrested for a similar rape came forward. See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of
False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 898 (2004). In England, the CCRC
inquiry is triggered by the individual, but journalists, other individuals, or organizations such as
Innocence Projects can prompt the CCRC inquiry. See Stephanie Roberts & Lynne Weathered,
Assisting the Factually Innocent: The Contradictions and Compatibility of Innocence Projects and
the Criminal Cases Review Commission, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (2009).
132 The Commission's website provides general background information. See CCRC, supra
note 129, at http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/about.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2009). The Commission was
established based on the recommendation of a royal body, known as the Runciman Commission,
which was assigned to study the causes of wrongful convictions following exonerations in a series of
high-profile cases including, most notably, the case of the "Birmingham Six." Id.; David Horan, The
Innocence Commission: An Independent Review Board for Wrongful Convictions, 20 N. ILL. U. L.
REv. 91, 125 (2000).
133 See Griffin, supra note 73, at 1268. The standard is articulated in the Criminal Appeal Act,
1995, c. 19, § 2(l)(a) (Eng.) ("[T]he Court of Appeal ... shall allow an appeal against conviction if
they think that the conviction is unsafe .... ).
134 See id. at 1269 (citing R. v. Cooper, I Q.B. 267 (1969)).
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misconduct in a separate case.1 35 The CCRC makes a referral to the court if it
finds there is a "real possibility" that, if it made the reference, the reviewing court
would not uphold the conviction, verdict, finding, or sentence.136
The CCRC investigation goes through several stages. First, an initial
screening is made for bare eligibility. 37 Eligible cases pass to the investigative
stage, at which those deemed to have no likelihood of success are dismissed.
38
Next, the case passes to a "substantive review" stage, at which point a case
manager and commission member or an independent investigating officer are
assigned. In this stage, there can be independent reports on forensic evidence,
psychiatric records, or other matters relevant to the case. 39 The case worker can
recommend either dismissal or referral to the court of appeals, in which case a
panel of three Commissioners must approve. In either case, an opinion or
"Statement of Reasons" is issued.14° As of August 2008, 10,978 completed
applications had been filed, of which 370 were referred to and decided by the
Court of Appeal, resulting in 261 convictions being set aside.14' In other words,
about 2.5% of the convictions reviewed by the CCRC, and a remarkable 70% of
those it referred to the court, were overturned based on a finding that the
conviction was "unsafe."
In Canada, convictions are reviewed by lawyers within the Criminal
Conviction Review Group (CCRG) of the Department of Justice 42 whose role is to
ascertain whether "there is a reasonable basis to conclude that a miscarriage of
justice likely occurred .... The review requires an application and supporting
documents containing "new and significant" information that there has been a
miscarriage of justice. 44  New information is "significant" if it is reasonably
capable of belief and relevant to the issue of guilt and could have affected the
135 R. v. Druhan, (unreported) (C.A. July 16, 1999), available at
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/1 999/2011 .html; R. v. Twitchell, 1 Crim. App. R. 373
(C.A. Oct. 26, 1999).
136 See Griffin, supra note 73, at 1279. The "real possibility" standard is also articulated on
the CCRC's website. CCRC, Our Role (Overview), http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/canwe/canwe_27.htm
(last visited Jan. 20, 2009). A "real possibility" has been described as "more than an outside chance
or bare possibility, but which may be less than a probability or likelihood or a racing certainty. See
R. v. CCRC, exparte Pearson, 3 All E.R.498 (Q.B. 1999).
137 This requires that the conviction be from England, Wales, or Northern Ireland, and that the
applicant have exhausted the appeals process. See CCRC, supra note 129.
138 See Griffin, supra note 73, at 1278-79.
139 Id. at 1279.
140 See CCRC, supra note 129.
141 See CCRC, Case Statistics: Figures to 31 July 2008,
http://www.ccrc.gov.uklcases/case_44.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
142 See supra note 130.
143 id. at 4.
'44 Id. at 2.
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verdict if it had been presented at trial.145 The multi-stage investigatory process
begins with a preliminary assessment of whether new and significant evidence has
been presented. If so, an investigation and a detailed report follow. 46  The
Minister of Justice receives the report along with the application and a legal
memorandum from CCRG and may grant various remedies, including a new trial
or new appeal proceeding, upon a determination that a miscarriage of justice likely
occurred. 1
47
Only one United States jurisdiction, North Carolina, has followed suit by
placing the investigation of convictions in the hands of a neutral body. Like its
English and Canadian counterparts, the judicially-created North Carolina
Innocence Inquiry Commission ("NCIIC"), established in August 2006,148 begins
with an application and proceeds in graduated stages; 149 however, the application
may come from law enforcement officials or others besides the defendant. 50 An
initial screening ascertains whether the applicant is claiming complete "factual
innocence" based on "credible" and "verifiable" evidence that has not previously
been heard. 51 If so, the case is presented to the Executive Director, who can either
examine the case personally or appoint a designee. The Executive Director or
145 Id.
146 Id. at 3-4. If not, the applicant is granted one year to supplement the application. Id.
147 Id. at 2.
148 See The North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission [hereinafter NCIIC], About Us,
http://www.innocencecomnission-nc.gov/ABOUTUS.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2009). This
commission examines individual cases making it distinct from the various commissions in many
states which review exoneration cases to determine the underlying causes of the wrongful convictions
and make recommendations for systemic change. See, e.g., Robert Carl Schehr, The Criminal Cases
Review Commission as a State Strategic Selection Mechanism, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1289, 1299
(2005).
149 See NCIIC Rules and Procedures, art. 4(G), http://www.innocencecommission-
nc.gov/rulesandprocedures.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2009) ("After a th[o]rough review has been
completed and the innocence claim meets the criteria set ou[t] in Article 3, the case may move into
the investigation phase.").
is0 Id. at art. 3(B) ("An innocence claim may be initiated in any reasonable manner from any
person or party.").
151 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1460(1) (2006). This does not include claims of secondary
involvement or reduced culpability. Cf NCIIC Rules and Procedures, supra note 149, at app. A. The
screening task has been "outsourced" to the North Carolina Center on Actual Innocence, and to its
Centers and students at various North Carolina law schools. See id. at Preamble, History of the
Commission. The NCHC's Preamble notes that "[tlhis relationship provides developmental
experience for students and a cost-efficient and enthusiastic resource for the Innocence Inquiry
Commission." Id. In a similar manner, the Conviction Integrity Unit at the Dallas County District
Attorney's Office works with and uses the screening resources of the Innocence Project of Texas.
See Dallas County District Attorney's Office, Conviction Integrity Unit,
http://www.dallasda.com/conviction-integrity.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Conviction
Integrity Unit].
152 See NCIIC Rules and Procedures, supra note 149, at art. 2(A). Notably, though anyone can
initiate a claim, those initiated by a judge, victim, law enforcement officer, correction official or
prosecutor get forwarded directly to Executive Director. Id. at art. 3(E).
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designee has discretion whether to advance a case to a formal investigative stage or
dismiss it.1 5 3  Following a formal investigation, the Commission's Executive
Director (or designee) presents findings to a hearing of the entire eight-member
Commission,154 which has subpoena power and conducts its hearing in a fact-
finding rather than adversarial format.'5 If it finds "sufficient evidence of factual
innocence to merit judicial review, '156 the Commission refers the case for review
by a three-judge Superior Court, 5 7 which will set aside a conviction if it
unanimously determines that "clear and convincing evidence" exists of the
person's innocence. 158 As of July 2008, the NCIIC had reviewed 135 cases, of
which it formally investigated four and referred only one for judicial review.'
59
In states other than North Carolina, discretion is left to prosecutors and the
police (or other investigators) regarding whether and when to investigate new
evidence of innocence. 16° Likewise, the prosecutor has discretion whether to assert
153 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1467(a) (2006). The statute also empowers the Commission to
"establish the criteria and screening process to be used to determine which cases shall be accepted for
review." Id. § 15A-1466(1). It is worth noting that while 135 cases are currently in review, only 4
have proceeded to formal investigation. See NCIIC, supra note 148, at Case Statistics,
http://www.innocencecommission-nc.gov/statistics.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
154 See NCIIC Rules and Procedures, supra note 149 at art. 6(A). Members are drawn from
prosecution, defense, judicial and public advocacy bodies. See id at Preamble, History of the
Comission.
i55 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1467(d) (2006).
156 Id. § 15A-1468(c). Five of eight votes (or eight of eight if the applicant pleaded guilty) are
needed to refer the case to the court. Regardless of the result, a copy of the Commission's opinion,
along with findings of fact and records of the proceedings, are served on the District Attorney in the
original jurisdiction. Id.
157 Id. § 15A-1469. When cases are referred for further review, the North Carolina Chief
Justice is charged with commissioning a three-judge panel in the Superior Court of the original
jurisdiction (not to include any judge who presided previous trials or motions involving the case).
The case then proceeds as an evidentiary hearing, with the District Attorney (or designee) from the
original conviction representing the State, and the applicant given a right to counsel. Id.
158 Id. § 15A-1469(h).
159 See NCIIC, Case Statistics, supra note 153. The case is that of Henry Reeves, a former
police officer convicted of child molestation in 2001. The case, in addition to being the first referred
for review, was also the first case the Commission heard. NCIIC's Executive Director noted that
subpoena power was crucial to the investigation, which in large part consisted of evidence from
witnesses who had not testified at trial but later came forward. Associated Press, State Innocence
Commission Recommends First Case (Dec. 18, 2007), available at
http://abclocal.go.com/wtvd/story?section=newsllocal&id=5841926&pt=print. See also Jerome M.
Maiatico, All Eyes on Us: A Comparative Critique of the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry
Commission, 56 DUKE L.J. 1345 (2007) (comparing North Carolina and England's Commissions).
'60 See Zacharias, supra note 34, at 175 ("[O]nce appeals are complete, the prosecutor may be
the only participant in the criminal justice system in a position to rectify a wrong."). As ABA Model
Rule 3.8(g) reflects, not all prosecutors have investigative resources. See Rule 3.8(g), supra note 26
(stating that when a prosecutor learns of sufficient new evidence he should, "undertake further
investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause an investigation" into the evidence). In some
jurisdictions, a prosecutor may rely primarily or entirely on the police or another investigative
agency. See, e.g., A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 85, § 3-3.1(a), at 47 ("A
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to a court or executive that a conviction should be reviewed or set aside.161 As
noted, ABA Model Rule 3.8(g) and (h), if adopted, would give prosecutors some
guidance and narrow their discretion, but only to a limited extent. 162 Among other
things, these provisions do not say who within the prosecutor's office should
conduct an investigation and make discretionary decisions. Offices may decide
such questions on an ad hoc basis or establish policies and institutional structures
to deal with post-conviction decision making. 163  Little information is publicly
available about how prosecutors' offices respond, because little, if any, of their
internal processes is exposed to public view. But it is likely that, despite what is
known about cognitive biases,' 6 prosecutors' offices ordinarily refer new evidence
to the trial prosecutor who obtained the conviction if he is still in the office, on the
theory that he best knows the case and is therefore best qualified to determine the
significance of the new evidence. 1
66
The one prominent exception is the work of the Dallas County District
Attorney Conviction Integrity Unit ("CIU"). 167  The newly elected District
Attorney, Craig Watkins, established the unit in 2007 because Dallas had the
dubious distinction of leading the country in the number of exonerations by
county. 168 The unit's charge is to examine more than 400 cases in which DNA
testing was denied by a court. 69 The unit, which receives legislative and private
funding, is housed in the District Attorney's office but is staffed by an assistant
district attorney, an investigator and a legal assistant, none of whom were
prosecutor ordinarily relies on police and other investigative agencies for investigation of alleged
criminal acts, but the prosecutor has an affirmative responsibility to investigate suspected illegal
activity when it is not adequately dealt with by other agencies.").
161 See Goldberg & Siegel, supra note 33 at 394-95 (discussing the spectrum of responses a
prosecutor may have to newly discovered evidence).
162 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
163 See Zacharias, supra note 34, at 238-39 (proposing various methods by which prosecutors'
offices can deal with post-conviction claims of innocence).
164 See Vorenberg, supra note 20.
165 See supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text.
166 Medwed, Preaching, supra note 32 (pointing out biases when prosecutors review their own
work or that of colleagues).
167 The Dallas Conviction Integrity Unit, however, is devoted largely to DNA cases. Dallas is
the first jurisdiction in the United States to have such a division set up within its District Attorney's
office. See Conviction Integrity Unit, supra note 15 1.
168 See Moreno, supra note 76.
169 Conviction Integrity Unit, supra note 151. Prior to 2007, Texas' post-conviction statute
providing for DNA testing was interpreted narrowly by the prosecution, which often argued that
defendants were not entitled to post-conviction DNA testing. Of the 438 motions filed by defendants,
the district attorney opposed testing in about half of those cases. Thirty-five defendants were granted
DNA tests and twelve of those people were exonerated. Telephone Interview with Michael Ware,
Director of the Conviction Integrity Unit (July 14, 2008) [hereinafter "Ware Interview"] (notes of
interview on file with Professor Yaroshefsky).
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employed by the office at the time of the convictions. 70 The CIU works with the
Innocence Project of Texas and public defenders' offices which conduct
investigations and present their findings.
171
The unit attempts to examine all relevant convictions on a case by case basis
with "a critical eye."'172 Once a claim of innocence is found to meet an initial
threshold of eligibility, 73 the unit seeks to make an independent determination of
guilt or innocence without placing weight on the jury's determination or on
considerations of finality. 174 The unit pursues leads with an "open or skeptical
mindset."'' 75 Many cases require little more than a follow up telephone call or
interview. If initial inquiries suggest that the defendant may be factually innocent,
the unit conducts further investigation, and if the additional investigation suggests
a "reasonable possibility that the person could be innocent," the unit fully reviews
the case. If the unit is ultimately convinced that there is a reasonable possibility of
innocence, it supports setting the conviction aside. If not, the unit leaves it up to
the defense to seek judicial relief.176  Under Texas law, the defendant must
establish that, had the results of the investigation been available at the time of the
trial or guilty plea, it would "unquestionably" establish his or her innocence. 1
77
III. WHEN SHOULD THE PROSECUTOR ULTIMATELY SUPPORT OR OPPOSE A
CONVICTED DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR RELIEF BASED ON ACTUAL INNOCENCE?
Consider a case in which, as in the Palladium case, newly discovered
evidence casts serious doubt on the reliability of a defendant's conviction.
Suppose that the prosecutor conducts an extensive investigation that corroborates
the initial new evidence but, unlike DNA testing results, the new evidence is not
sufficiently reliable or probative to dispel all doubts about the defendant's guilt.
The prosecutor discloses the information to the defendant, who moves for judicial
relief or, if none is available, requests executive clemency. The prosecutor is
170 See Conviction Integrity Unit, supra note 151.
171 Id.
172 See Ware Interview, supra note 169.
173 The threshold standard employed by the office is "akin to the Federal 12(b)(6) one: have
they stated a claim." Id. In other words, "have they stated a claim of innocence that does not defy
the law of gravity?" Id. Ware noted that approximately 25% of inquiries do not state a claim
because they are "gripes about the attorney, food in prison and the like." Many inquiries require us to
"strain the fill in the blanks." Id.
174 According to Ware, the unit will then look at the case "with a fresh eye .... We are not
trying to prove things one way or the other. We have no axe to grind. We are searching for the
'factual historical truth.' We will not forego review because fifteen years ago an attorney did not
discover evidence or put it on at trial. Nor will we do so because it was raised in a motion for a new
trial and the trial judge was not impressed." Id.
175 Id. (i.e., skeptical of the conviction).
176 Id.
177 Exparte Thompson, 153 S.W.3d 416, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
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satisfied that the investigation is complete and that no significant additional
evidence is likely to be found. At that point, viewing the new evidence together
with the evidence available before and during the trial, the defendant's guilt seems
less likely than it did to the prosecutors' office when it decided to indict the
defendants and when it asked the jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable. Should
the prosecutor support the defendant's efforts, oppose them, or remain neutral?
The ABA model rules suggest that, if the evidence of the defendant's
innocence is "clear and convincing," the prosecutor should make reasonable,
affirmative efforts to rectify the wrongful conviction.178  Shy of "clear and
convincing evidence," however, what should the prosecutor do? Should she
oppose the defendant's efforts in order to ensure adversarial testing of the new
evidence? Should she be guided by whether she would have an indictable or a
triable case if she knew at the outset what she now knows? Should the test be
whether she would in fact have brought an indictment if she had a complete picture
at the time? Should the question be whether the trial's outcome would have
differed if the jury knew then what the prosecutor knows now? Should she seek to
secure the defendant's release whenever she has serious doubts about the
defendant's guilt, even if she is not entirely convinced of the defendant's
innocence, or only when the evidence of innocence is "clear and convincing," as
the model rule suggests? These questions are important because, as previously
discussed, the outcome will often turn on what position the prosecution adopts.
A. The Relevance (or Irrelevance) of Charging Discretion
As discussions of the Palladium case suggest, 179 one might instinctively look
at how prosecutors exercise charging discretion-that is, how they decide whether
or not to bring criminal charges at the outset-for guidance on how they should
exercise discretion whether to seek to set a conviction aside in light of new
exculpatory evidence. Perhaps the prosecutor should defend the conviction if,
given what she now knows, she would ordinarily commence charges against an
individual. Conversely, perhaps the prosecutor should seek to set the conviction
aside if, given what she now knows, she would not have brought charges against
an individual. As discussed below, we doubt that either is the right approach.
There is a threshold question: What does the prosecutor now know? The test
presumably should not be whether the prosecutor would bring charges based only
on the evidence now available to introduce at a trial. Over time, witnesses may
die, witnesses' memories may fade, and other occurrences that have no relevance
to guilt or innocence may similarly make it difficult or impossible to obtain a
conviction.' 80  To the extent that evidence and other information previously
171 See A.B.A. MODEL RULES, supra note 26, at R. 3.8(h).
179 See supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text.
1to See Boemer, supra note 22, at 1980 (stating that a reason for time bars on innocence claims
is "the recognition that memories fade, witnesses disappear"); James Herbie DiFonzo, In Praise of
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available to the prosecution has not been discredited, it should fairly be taken into
account because the fundamental question is whether an innocent person was
wrongly convicted, not whether the defendant can be successfully retried. The
prosecutor should engage in the tricky exercise of determining the credibility of
prior evidence that is no longer available. She should consider all the credible
information, currently available or not, and decide whether the evidence of guilt or
innocence satisfies whatever standard the prosecutor employs.
It is doubtful, however, whether the standard employed in the charging
decision should be applied to the information considered by a prosecutor post-
conviction. A significant part of the problem with using charging discretion as an
analogue or touchstone is that there is no uniform standard to govern the everyday
determination of whether there is enough likelihood of guilt to warrant bringing
charges. 18' Beyond that, the rationales for employing various possible standards in
the charging context would not be applicable to the post-conviction context (even
assuming the rationales are persuasive in the charging context).
The charging decision calls for some gatekeeping to avoid prosecuting
innocent individuals, but there is no agreement on how much. 182 As a legal matter,
the prosecution is not permitted to commence charges, whether by indictment or
information, without "probable cause."' 83  State ethics rules incorporate that
standard as a basis of discipline, providing that the prosecutor may not
"knowingly" bring charges without probable cause1 ---a standard that has rarely,
if ever, become the subject of disciplinary proceedings. 185 Prosecutors might take
Statutes of Limitations in Sex Offense Cases, 41 Hous. L. REV. 1205, 1210 (2004) ("Time fades
memories, witnesses die or disappear, and documentation is destroyed or irretrievably misplaced.").
181 The American Bar Association Criminal Justice Standards lists elements that prosecutors
should consider in making charging decisions such as "the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the
accused is in fact guilty." A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 85, § 3-3.9(i).
However, the standards do not say whether a reasonable doubt should foreclose bringing a charge or
if it is merely a factor. See also Vorenberg, supra note 20, at 1547 ("When prosecutors initially
receive a case, they are frequently uncertain whether there is 'probable cause' or whatever other
standard they employ as a basis for charging.").
182 See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics As Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 1573, 1588
(2003) (explaining that the gate-keeping role derives from the prosecutor's position as a "minister of
justice").
183 See, e.g., United States v. Bamer, 441 F.3d 1310, 1315 (11th Cir. 2006) (decision to
prosecute for additional charges in superseding indictment prior to trial on merits is within
prosecutor's discretion as long as probable cause exists).
1s4 See A.B.A. MODEL RULES, supra note 26, at R. 3.8(a) ("The prosecutor in a criminal case
shall refrain from prosecuting a charge the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause.").
'85 See Sandra Caron George, Prosecutorial Discretion: What's Politics Got to Do With It?, 18
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 739, 750 (2005) ("Indeed, with respect to enforcement of Model Rule 3.8, and
the requirement that charges be brought only where there is probable cause, the courts have been
reluctant to impose restrictions on prosecutorial discretion."); Lars Nelson, Preserving the Public
Trust: Prosecutors' Professional Responsibility to Advocate for the Electronic Recording of
Custodial Interrogations, 44 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 1, 19 (2007) ("Dismissal and reversal for probable
cause fail to check prosecutors and are rare because probable cause is an easily met threshold. Even
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the view that the legal/disciplinary standard of probable cause defines the full
extent of their gate keeping responsibility. They might explain this minimal
approach to gate keeping in any of several ways. One may take the view that it is
the province of the jury, not the prosecutor, to decide on a defendant's guilt;' 86 that
the jury is better qualified to make that determination in cases where guilt is not
certain; 187 that it would be unfair to the public and the victim (if any) to act as a
roadblock to a potentially successful prosecution;' 88 that it would waste
prosecutorial resources to have to undertake a rigorous review, rather than simply
accepting the evidence accumulated by the police, presenting it to the grand jury,
and trying the case; 189 that faith should be placed in the adversary system's ability
to weed out bad cases; 190 that prosecutors should defer to the presumed
when higher courts rebuke prosecutors, ethical sanctions rarely follow. In fact, ethical sanctions are
rarely sought at all.").
186 See Nelson, supra note 185, at 17-18 ("The ideal system is one in which prosecutors, grand
juries, and magistrate judges' determinations of probable cause are checked by juries determining
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, with ninety-five percent of all convictions occurring
through pleas, most probable cause determinations represent the highest threshold of guilt met.").
187 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 155-56 (1968)) ("The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power-to
make available the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous or
mistaken prosecutor .... "); H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical
Standard: Guidance From the ABA, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1145, 1159 (1973) ("[W]hen the issue stands
in equipoise in [the prosecutor's] own mind, when he is honestly unable to judge where the truth of
the matter lies, I see no flaw in the conduct of the prosecutor who fairly lays the matter before the
judge or jury.").
188 This is especially true in the context of domestic abuse cases where "[r]esearch indicates
that despite the arrests, only a small portion of domestic violence cases are prosecuted; thus, some
locales have adopted 'no drop' policies that range from eliminating all prosecutorial discretion so that
all cases are prosecuted, to less rigid assumptions of prosecution." Nina W. Tarr, Employment and
Economic Security for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 16 S. CAL. REv. L. & Soc. JUST. 371, 389-90
(2007).
189 See Robert Heller, Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal Law: The
Need for Meaningful Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1309, 1328
(1997) (arguing that one justification for prosecutorial discretion is that frequent prosecutorial and
judicial review of charging decisions would be a waste of resources); Gerard E. Lynch, Our
Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2117, 2124 (1998) ("[Iln all
likelihood, the prosecutor simply accepts the results of the police investigation, and any process of
independent adjudication occurs at the instigation of defense counsel."). But see In re Grand Jury
Subpoena of Lynne Stewart, 545 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977 n.1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (citing the famous
phrase of New York Chief Judge Sol Wachtler that a Grand Jury indictment is so easy to procure that
a Grand Jury would "indict a ham sandwich").
190 See Bandes, supra note 121, at 488-89 ("The system is built on the notion that if each
adversary acts zealously on behalf of his client, the truth will come out."); Jim Yardley, Man is
Cleared in Murder Case After 8 Years, N.Y. TIMes, Oct. 29, 1998, at BI (reporting the case of a man
wrongly convicted of murder-the Assistant District Attorney was asked "What do you say to [this
gentleman]?"-he replied "We live by an adversarial system. Our job is to present evidence we
believe is credible. The defense's job is to poke holes in it. In a sense, the system worked, although
it took some time."). But see United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817 (3rd Cir. 1979) (At the
grand jury, the prosecutor "operates without the check of a judge or a trained legal adversary, and [is]
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constitutional and legislative judgments that probable cause is enough to justify a
prosecution;' 9' or that deference should be given to the police's judgment that the
defendant is guilty.
1 92
Alternatively, as a matter of discretion, prosecutors may engage in slightly
more rigorous gatekeeping that focuses on the strength of the trial evidence,
although not on the separate question of whether the prosecutor is herself confident
that the defendant is guilty. For example, the prosecutor may ask whether there is
sufficient evidence for a jury to return a conviction' 93 or, setting the bar higher,
whether the jury is likely to convict. 194 This approach may be explained by the
prosecution's interest in preserving resources for cases in which a conviction is
likely to be obtained. 195 Or it may be explained by the recognition that it is unfair
to punish individuals unless they are first convicted. Making defendants endure
virtually immune from public scrutiny."); DEBORAH DAY EMERSON & NANCY L. AMES, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUST., THE ROLE OF THE GRAND JURY AND THE PRELIMINARY HEARING IN PRETRIAL SCREENING 68
(1984) (arguing that grand juries serve as a relatively weak check on prosecutorial discretion); Robert
W. Gordon, Impudence and Partnership: Starr's OIC and the Clinton-Lewinsky Affair, 68 FORDHAM
L. REv. 639, 642-43 (1999) (judges are also deprived of the power to check prosecutors).
191 Cf Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession 's Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors,
36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 275, 284-85 (2007) ("The low charging standard of probable cause encourages
abuse of the charging power, allowing prosecutors to charge an individual in order to intimidate,
harass, or coerce a guilty plea in a case in which the government cannot meet its burden of proof at
trial."); Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of Sovereignty and
the Limits of Law, 33 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 387, 397 (2008) ("[W]hile there is a constitutional
standard to which prosecutors must adhere, it does not prevent the prosecutor from charging
exercising [sic] selectively-even, presumably, in cases where there is probable cause to indict many
similarly situated persons.").
192 See JOAN E. JACOBY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., THE PROSECUTOR'S CHARGING DECISION: A
POLICY PERSPECTIVE 15 (1977) (citing cases where prosecutors merely adopt the police's
determination of guilt or innocence). But see Vorenberg, supra note 20, at 1547 ("Many of the cases
initiated by the police or by citizen complainants have serious flaws.... The most justifiable use of
prosecutorial discretion is the screening out of these weak cases.").
193 See, e.g., A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 85, § 3-3.9(a) ("A
prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal
charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction."); Leonard R.
Mellon et al., The Prosecutor Constrained by His Environment: A New Look at Discretionary Justice
in the United States, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 52, 59-62 (1981) (discussing the use of the
"legal sufficiency" standard in charging decisions).
194 See NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 86,
§ 43.3 ("The prosecutor should file only those charges which he reasonably believes can be
substantiated by admissible evidence at trial.").
195 See Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, Charge Movement and Theories of Prosecutors,
91 MARQ. L. REv. 9, 11 (2007) ("Theoretical accounts of the prosecutor's work also build on critical
assumptions about the objectives of individual prosecutors. . . . Still others may be driven by
organizational needs (e.g., conserving scarce resources).").
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the anxiety and expense of a trial when they are likely to be acquitted is arguably a
misuse of the criminal process.1
96
Finally, prosecutors may engage in more serious gatekeeping that involves
declining to prosecute certain cases even when there is a likelihood of securing a
conviction. This approach can be explained by the prosecutor's concern about the
risk that innocent individuals may be convicted because the criminal process is
unavoidably fallible-for example, the defense may fail to expose the falsity of
testimony unwittingly offered by the prosecutor or otherwise be an ineffective
advocate, or the jury may overvalue eyewitness testimony, confessions or expert
testimony, or undervalue the defendant's truthful testimony. The prosecutor may
assume a professional obligation to take account of, and try to compensate for, this
risk, given the public interest in avoiding false convictions, by essentially serving
as a preliminary fact finder.197 That is, the prosecutor may decline to bring
charges, even in a winnable case, unless she or others in her office are convinced
to some level of confidence that the defendant is guilty. 198
This does not simply involve substituting the prosecutor's judgment for that
of the jury because the prosecutor could look not only at the trial evidence but at
other available information.'99 Sometimes inadmissible information will confirm
the prosecution's belief in guilt, such as when the court suppresses damning
physical evidence. But at other times, information that will not come before the
jury will weaken the prosecution's belief in the defendant's guilt. Doubts may be
raised by exculpatory out-of-court statements made by now-unavailable witnesses
(such as deceased eyewitnesses or accomplices who will now refuse to testify to
avoid incriminating themselves). Or, while preparing witnesses to testify, the
prosecutor may have doubts raised by witnesses' demeanor, the weakness of their
recollections, or the equivocal nature of their accounts, even though (thanks to
effective witness preparation) the witnesses can be expected to present their
testimony more convincingly by the time of trial. The prosecutor may even be
influenced by representations made by the defendant, or by defense counsel, even
196 See John Gleeson, Supervising Criminal Investigations: The Proper Scope of the
Supervisory Power of Federal Judges, 5 J.L. & PoL'Y 423, 425-26 (1997) (discussing the negative
impact of a grand jury subpoena, an investigation, and an indictment on the defendant).
197 See Ben Kempinen, The Ethics of Prosecutor Contact with the Unrepresented Defendant,
19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmcs 1147, 1179-80 (2006) (arguing that prosecutors have a duty to investigate
before a charging decision is made because due to the small amount of cases that go to trial, the
charging decision is arguably the most important factual determination of guilt or innocence).
198 See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 33, at 338 ("Some prosecutors... maintain that they would
never prosecute a defendant unless they were personally convinced of the defendant's guilt.");
Kempinen, supra note 197, at 1180 n.l10 (stating the Wisconsin prosecutors had adopted a
"'convictability-personal-belief-in-guilt' standard").
199 See William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1083, 1101
n.46 (1988) (stating that evidentiary rules may exclude certain evidence, and that "[t]he rules
presume that ... judgments [based on this evidence] would be unreliable or inefficient; even when
this is true with respect to judges and juries, however, it is often not true with respect to lawyers.").
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though there is little likelihood that the defendant will testify or that, if he does, the
jury will credit him after the prosecutor's withering cross-examination.
When prosecutors demand to be personally convinced of guilt, the level of
their conviction may vary. The prosecutor may be satisfied, and take a case to
trial, only if she is convinced that the defendant's guilt is more likely than not, that
his guilt is clear and convincing, or that his guilt is established in her mind beyond
a reasonable doubt.200 Bennett Gershman has offered an even more rigorous
standard, arguing that the prosecutor should be convinced of the defendant's guilt
to a "moral certainty," 201 although it is unlikely that any prosecutors are so
demanding. Chances are that most prosecutors who act as personal gatekeepers
never articulate their internal standard of proof. Prosecutors may aver that they
will not prosecute defendants whom they believe to be innocent, but that elides the
question whether they will prosecute when they are agnostic on the question and, if
not, how certain of guilt they must be. Under this gatekeeping approach, there is
also a further question of who in the prosecutor's office must be convinced of the
defendant's guilt-the trial prosecutor or other prosecutor who best knows the
facts, the trial prosecutor's supervisor, the district attorney herself, or some
combination of these?
20 2
As this survey suggests, one does not get very far by analogizing prosecutorial
discretion post-conviction to prosecutors' charging discretion, given that
approaches to the charging decision may vary so widely. Furthermore, it seems
plain that the rationales at least for the minimal gatekeeping approach are not
equally applicable to the post-conviction stage. Prior to trial, a prosecutor may
rationalize that she is primarily a trial lawyer in an adversary process,20 3 that there
are sufficient alternatives to prosecutorial gatekeeping to prevent false convictions,
and that primary responsibility for ascertaining guilt or innocence rests
200 See FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME
22 (1969) (stating that prosecutors are not held to a reasonable doubt standard in charging decisions,
but that some hold themselves to that standard); A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra
note 85, § 3-3.9(b)(i) ("The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause consistent
with the public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may exist which
would support a conviction. Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor may properly consider in
exercising his or her discretion are: (i) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact
guilty"); id. § 3-3.9(c) ("A prosecutor should not be compelled by his or her supervisor to prosecute a
case in which he or she has a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused."); see also NAT'L DIST.
ATTORNEYS ASS'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 86, § 42.3(a) (stating that a
prosecutor is justified in not prosecuting if he has "[d]oubt as to the accused's guilt").
201 Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor's Exercise of the Charging
Discretion, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513, 522-30 (1993).
202 See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, "The U.S. Attorneys Scandal'" and the Allocation
of Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIo ST. L.J. 187, 194-200 (2008) (discussing the allocation of decision-
making within a prosecutors' office).
203 See Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L.
REv. 669, 691-97 (1992) (discussing reliance on the adversarial model as a justification in charging
decisions).
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elsewhere. 204  After a conviction, in contrast, there is minimal post-conviction
process available to which the prosecutor may defer on the question of whether an
injustice was done.20 5 The prosecutor, not the judge or jury, is the key fact finder.
As a practical matter, there is no one else on whom to shift responsibility.20 6
This is most obviously true when only executive clemency is available. If the
prosecutor does not support an application for clemency, the application is almost
certainly futile, because the prosecutor's opposition will be understood to mean
that the prosecutor believes the defendant to be guilty. A governor will rarely
release a defendant based on innocence when the prosecutor, who is presumably in
the best position to make the judgment, is evidently not persuaded that an injustice
was done. The governor will not afford an adversarial hearing at which the
prosecution and defense will dispute the significance of new evidence and the
governor will make an independent determination of guilt or innocence. Given the
strong presumption that convictions are reliable, the governor predictably will
defer to the prosecution's evident conclusion that the conviction is just,
notwithstanding whatever new evidence is offered.20 7
That the prosecutor's beliefs play a pivotal role is only slightly less true when
the court has authority to grant post-conviction relief. A prosecutor who is
personally convinced of the defendant's innocence might nevertheless oppose a
new trial motion in order to provide for adversary testing of the evidence and to
shift decision making to the court, 1° 8 but the court will not perceive that as the
basis for the prosecutor's opposition and predictably will defer to the prosecutor's
seeming judgment that the defendant is guilty.209  Further, it will be difficult
without the prosecutor's assistance to prove the defendant's innocence, because the
defense will rarely have access to evidence comparable to that of the
prosecution. 210 The Palladium case is an illustration. The prosecution had access
204 See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
205 See supra Part ll.B.
206 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
207 See STAFF REPORT, supra note 117.
208 See, e.g., Medwed, Zeal Deal, supra note 32, at 129 (discussing the opposition to claims of
innocence in spite of clear evidence in support). In a Texas case, DNA testing showed that someone
other than the defendant was the rapist; however, the prosecutors opposed his motion for a new trial
by attacking the sufficiency of the evidence and interposing two new theories of the case never used
at trial. The court denied the motion. See Hilary S. Ritter, Note, It's the Prosecution's Story, But
They're Not Sticking to it: Applying Harmless Error and Judicial Estoppel to Exculpatory Post-
Conviction DNA Testing Cases, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 825, 825-27 (2005).
209 See Medwed, Zeal Deal, supra note 32, at 128 n.14 ("In New York State, for example,
courts summarily deny post-conviction motions with regularity. Behavior by prosecutors that signals
the possible legitimacy of a particular claim may affect a judge's decision regarding whether to grant
an evidentiary hearing and, accordingly, enhance the likelihood that actually innocent prisoners will
be vindicated.").
210 See Bryant, supra note 55, at 122-23 (noting how procedures for newly discovered
evidence claims typically presuppose that prisoners already have the exonerating evidence and noting
that courts have offered mixed views on whether to grant discovery in cases where the pertinent
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to imprisoned witnesses and other witnesses who were far more likely to speak
with law enforcement authorities than with defense counsel. 21 ' Evidently, the
prosecutor's familiarity with some of the exculpatory evidence from having
personally conducted aspects of the investigation was superior to that of defense
counsel.2 12  In that case, the prosecutor made efforts to compensate for the
defense's limitations and to ensure that all the relevant exculpatory evidence was
presented. 13 In contrast, if the prosecutor assumes an adversarial stance, as she
would at the trial stage, and withholds her honest judgment about the likelihood of
the defendant's innocence based on her investigation of newly discovered
evidence, she subverts the available procedures for correcting error and potentially
deceives the ultimate decision-maker.
At the same time, the most demanding standards for the exercise of charging
discretion seem equally inapt. It may seem reasonable for the prosecutor to sit as a
thirteenth juror before charges are brought and decline to try a case if she has a
reasonable doubt about guilt. But it would be harder to justify supporting a
convicted defendant's release whenever new evidence raises no more than a
reasonable doubt in the prosecutor's mind. A reasonable doubt about guilt is a far
cry from a belief that a miscarriage of justice occurred because the defendant is, in
fact, innocent. Such a low threshold would be administratively burdensome
because it would put prosecutors in the business of constantly reevaluating
cases.214 Arguably, it would provide defendants and their counsel an incentive to
game the system at the trial stage by not looking hard for exculpatory evidence that
might otherwise be available.21 5 Because of the double jeopardy right, this
statute is silent); Gershman, supra note 33, at 329 ("Because of the prosecutor's control of the
evidence, he has the ability to thwart a defendant's ability to learn about favorable witnesses .... ").
211 See Tavemise, supra note 3 (The key witnesses and real killers were Joseph Pillot and
Thomas Morales, two Bronx gang members who were incarcerated or under investigation for other
charges.).
212 See Findley, Innocents at Risk, supra note 31, at 898-99 (discussing the systemic
disparities in the ability to develop evidence); Weiser, supra note 1 ("Over 21 months, starting in
2003, [assistant district attorney Bibb] and two detectives conducted more than 50 interviews in more
than a dozen states, ferreting out witnesses the police had somehow missed or ignored.").
213 See Weiser, supra note 1 ("[Bibb] tracked down hard-to-find or reluctant witnesses who
pointed to other suspects and prepared them to testify for the defense. He talked strategy with
defense lawyers. And when they veered from his coaching, he cornered them in the hallway and
corrected them.").
214 Cf Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (whether Due Process requires a
particular procedure necessitates consideration of, among other things, "the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail").
215 Cf Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 491-92 (1986) ("Nor do we agree that the possibility
of 'sandbagging' vanishes once a trial has ended in conviction, since appellate counsel might well
conclude that the best strategy is to select a few promising claims for airing on appeal, while
reserving others for federal habeas review should the appeal be unsuccessful. Moreover, we see little
reason why counsel's failure to detect a colorable constitutional claim should be treated differently
from a deliberate but equally prejudicial failure by counsel to raise such a claim.").
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standard would lead to defendants' release in circumstances where they could not
be retried if later information dispelled the prosecutor's reasonable doubt. 216 This
approach would appear to be disrespectful of the jury process and arguably put too
much power in the prosecution's hands.217 And perhaps most importantly, by
definition, this standard would result in the release of a substantial number of
guilty defendants for each innocent defendant who was freed.
The criminal justice system would be radically transformed if, once having
convicted a defendant in a fair trial under the reasonable doubt standard, the
defendant's conviction had to be constantly reevaluated to ascertain whether new
information raised a reasonable doubt. Besides burdening prosecutors, closure
would be denied to witnesses, victims and, indeed, to defendants.218 There is a
legitimate interest in something approximating "finality" in the criminal process,
21 9
which would be seriously undercut by a standard calling for prosecutors to try to
secure a convicted defendant's release whenever new evidence raises no more than
a reasonable doubt about guilt, rather than some genuine likelihood of innocence.
B. Exercising Discretion in Light of the Prosecutor's Post-Conviction Role
Our argument is that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion post-conviction
must reflect three things-first, the role of the prosecutor within an executive
branch; second, the executive branch's commitment to the basic principle that the
state should not punish innocent people; and third, cognizance of the fact that
convicted defendants are sometimes innocent. In brief, our argument is that it is a
mistake in the post-conviction stage to view the prosecutor's role primarily as that
of an advocate within an adversary process. In many cases, there is no adversary
process available; the question of whether to grant redress is entrusted exclusively
to the executive branch. 220  Further, even when judicial relief is available, it is
narrowly circumscribed, not because there is a public interest in making it
exceedingly difficult to correct false convictions, but because the legislative intent
216 Cf In re Cruz, 129 Cal. Rptr.2d 31, 38 (Ct. App. 2003) (In the context of newly discovered
evidence there is the possibly that collateral estoppel or double jeopardy would apply; however,
"there [is no] authority preventing a retrial after a writ of habeas corpus is issued on the ground of
newly discovered evidence ... ").
217 See Barry Siegel, Presumed Guilty: An Illinois Murder Case Became a Test of Conscience
Inside the System, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1992, (Magazine), at 18. (After Rolando Cruz was convicted
of murder, Brian Dugan came forward and confessed. The State's Attorney refused to consider the
evidence, saying, "To confess error now was to impeach a DuPage County jury and the very
workings of the legal system. I believe in the integrity of the jury system.").
218 See sources cited supra note 50.
219 Goldberg & Siegel, supra note 33, at 409 ("In a theoretical sense, finality is necessary to
maintain the legitimacy and integrity of the criminal justice system. In a practical sense, victims of
violent crime seek finality as a way of promoting closure. A defendant's postconviction request for
scientific tests threatens to undermine both types of finality, which adds to the resistance to such
testing.").
220 See supra Part ll.B.
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is to shift principal responsibility for doing so to the executive, with the judiciary
as a fallback in many jurisdictions only in crystal clear cases of innocence. As the
executive branch official best positioned to assess whether a convicted defendant is
factually innocent, the prosecutor has primary responsibility for correcting error
and abdicates this responsibility when she fails to take reasonably available
measures to rectify wrongful convictions.221 This responsibility is not significantly
different from that of correcting procedural or legal error. Yet it is ultimately more
important: the interest in finality is a less compelling justification for preserving
convictions of people who are innocent than for preserving convictions in the face
of procedural error.222
To begin with, the state and federal government have an obligation to free
innocent individuals. There is no legitimate public interest in preserving
convictions of innocent defendants and continuing their confinement (much less, in
capital cases, executing them). The public interest in correcting false convictions
is logically as compelling as the public interest in avoiding false convictions,
which finds expression in the constitutional design of the adversary process. What
then is one to make of the absence of a comparable process post-conviction? The
answer is simply that the constitution vests principal authority elsewhere. The
constitutional authority to grant clemency is an expression of both the public
interest in correcting false convictions and the executive branch's obligation to do
so. 22 3 Not only does the executive branch have a constitutional obligation to free
the innocent, it has a moral responsibility to do so. 22 4  Like the prosecution's
obligation not to use its charging discretion arbitrarily,225 the obligation to free the
innocent is not legally enforceable. But its existence is no less compelling.226 The
221 See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments,
38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142, 151 n.35 (1971) (noting his own surprise at how many prosecutors let cases
go to higher levels rather than take the opportunity to recommend clemency at an earlier stage); see,
e.g., Houston v. Partee, 978 F.2d 362, 364-65 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing how the prosecutors denied
the existence of exculpatory evidence in their possession and how this led to the convicted defendants
sitting in jail for years longer than they should have).
222 See Friendly, supra note 221, at 160 (arguing that an exception should be made to finality
when there is evidence that an innocent person is being punished); see also Green, supra note 75, at
642 ("[A]mong the sovereign's paramount objectives are not merely to convict and punish
lawbreakers but to avoid harming, and certainly to avoid punishing, innocent people.").
223 See KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 9
(1989) (arguing that "pardons are duties ofjustice").
224 See Goldberg & Siegel, supra note 33, at 393 ("No ethical prosecutor should ever oppose
the pursuit of justice, insofar as this means ensuring that an innocent person has not been convicted.
To the extent that this requires disclosure or release of evidence, extant ethical precepts require this
disclosure or release."). But see Bakken, supra note 34, at 560 ("However, in the cases of innocent
persons who have been convicted and sentenced but who continue to, or for the first time, claim
innocence, prosecutors have no ethical duty to assist in investigating such claims.").
225 See, e.g., United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1299-1300 (9th Cir. 1992)
(observing that charging or plea bargaining decisions made in an arbitrary or capricious manner may
be a constitutional violation but not one for which a judicial remedy is available).
226 See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
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ongoing executive obligation to correct error is part of what justifies punishment of
convicted defendants in the teeth of constant reminders that the criminal justice
process, for all the rights it affords, is fallible.227
The principal power and responsibility for correcting error--even if not the
ultimate legal authority-reside in prosecutors.228  They have a de facto error-
correction function. As a legal matter, and in theory, the power resides
elsewhere-with the chief executive and, in some states, also with the court to a
limited extent. 2 9 But, as a practical matter, the prosecutor has the largest say.23°
Neither the governor nor the court is in a position independently to investigate and
evaluate new evidence. Among executive branch officials, the prosecutor is in the
best position to do so, albeit with substantial assistance from the police or other
investigative agencies.231
Judge (then Professor) Gerard Lynch has written about the prosecutor's
administrative role in the charging stage.232 Post-conviction, the prosecutor's role,
as a representative of the executive branch, should be viewed even more clearly as
administrative, not adversarial. 233 The executive's obligation is to determine for
itself whether the convicted defendant is innocent or guilty, once new evidence of
innocence is sufficiently compelling to warrant an inquiry. The executive's
obligation is to view the question objectively, not from an adversarial stance.234
Here, the prosecution function, unlike at trial, is quasi-judicial, in the sense that the
obligation is to be neutral and objective.235
There is no reason why the prosecutor's stance should be different in
jurisdictions where there is a possibility of judicial relief. If the prosecutor is
persuaded that the defendant has met the standard for judicial relief-either
227 See generally Exparte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120-21 (1925) ("Executive clemency exists
to afford relief from undue harshness or evident mistake in the operation or enforcement of the
criminal law.... It is a check entrusted to the executive .... ).
228 See supra notes 22-23 (discussing the prevalence of false convictions).
229 See supra Part lI.B.
230 See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
231 See sources cited supra note 114 (prosecutor is usually in control of potentially exculpatory
evidence).
232 See Lynch, supra note 189.
233 See id. at 2141-51 (arguing for the adoption of an administrative role of prosecutors into
the adversarial system).
234 See generally Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 Wis. L.
REv. 837 (2004) (discussing the need for unbiased and nonadversarial decision-making by
prosecutors); see also Jake Sussman, Suspect Choices: Lineup Procedures and the Abdication of
Judicial and Prosecutorial Responsibility for Improving the Criminal Justice System, 27 N.Y.U. REv.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 507, 532 (2002) ("Unlike defense counsel's role as unequivocal advocate for an
individual client, the prosecutor retains the critical responsibility of neutral inquiry into all aspects of
a case.").
235 See Green, supra note 75, at 643 (noting that overturning an unfairly procured conviction is
easier in a prosecutorial office that understands that its duty is to "seek justice").
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because the new evidence casts doubt on the correctness of the verdict (as in New
York) 236 or because it unquestionably establishes the defendant's innocence (as in
Texas)Z37 -the prosecutor should not oppose such an application simply to allow
an adversarial testing of the new evidence. 238 Even if the judicial standard has not
necessarily been met, it seems wrong for a prosecutor to oppose an application for
relief if the prosecutor is sufficiently convinced of the defendant's innocence. To
be sure, the prosecutor may not deceive the court by overstating the evidence of
innocence. But neither should the prosecutor oppose defense efforts to rectify a
wrongful conviction, once the evidence of innocence is compelling enough to
persuade the prosecutor that the conviction was wrongful and should be rectified.
The key question, then, is how convinced the prosecutor must be of the
defendant's innocence or how doubtful she must be of the convicted defendant's
guilt to call for her to rectify an apparent injustice through whatever judicial or
executive process is available.239 Our claim is that the answer is not to be found in
the standard established by the legislature for judicial relief. The fact that some
state courts are given a limited role does not mean that the legislature thereby
intended to establish the standard for prosecutors' exercise of discretion.2 4°
Prosecutors are free to seek a defendant's release independently of whether that
can be achieved through the judicial process. The interest in achieving finality in
the judicial process dictates the extent, if any, of courts' authority to remedy
241wrongful convictions. It does not follow that there is an equal interest in
constricting the administrative process. A legislature might set the standard high
for judicial relief-or make it entirely unavailable-precisely because it wants to
236 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
237 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
238 See Zacharias, supra note 34, at 210 ("A prosecutor who knows for a fact that a convicted
defendant is innocent should take some action. No conception of the prosecutor's role-as an
advocate, defender of the public trust, or protector of victims-would countenance the prosecutor's
participation in keeping a clearly innocent person incarcerated.").
239 Prosecutors might apply a range of "presumptions of guilt":
Prosecutors might carry forward the pre-conviction standard: they should help a
defendant avoid (or void) his conviction only when they no longer have probable cause
(i.e., a good reason to believe the defendant is guilty). Prosecutors might raise the
standard: they should help defendant only if they no longer have any reason to believe in
the validity of the conviction, not even a suspicion that defendant remains guilty.
Alternatively, prosecutors might reverse the presumption to one focusing on innocence.
Prosecutors might avoid defense-oriented action unless they "are almost certain,"
"strongly believe," "believe," "have reason (or probable cause) to believe," or "suspect"
that a defendant is innocent.
See id. at 211.
240 In some cases the legislature merely has yet to consider the issue. See, e.g., Anderson v.
Gladden, 383 P.2d 986, 991-92 (Or. 1963) (The Court refused to accept that executive clemency was
the only avenue available in the case before it and suggested that further legislation was necessary to
provide a framework within the current statutory post-conviction procedure.).
241 See Goldberg & Siegel, supra note 33.
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vest primary or exclusive authority in the executive to correct wrongful
convictions. By not setting the standard, the legislature leaves standard setting to
prosecutors' discretion. 42
We have already suggested why it would be wrong to try to obtain a
convicted defendant's release whenever there is a "reasonable doubt." At the
other extreme, the new model disciplinary standard, which would require
prosecutorial efforts when there is "clear and convincing" evidence of innocence,
is also inapt.2 3 It is meant to set a disciplinary floor, and thus presupposes that
prosecutors will act even when the defendant's innocence is less obvious than that.
At least if the prosecutor concludes that the defendant is probably innocent,2 "
based on more complete knowledge than was available at the time of criminal
proceedings, it seems intuitively right that the prosecutor should join in efforts to
secure the defendant's release.2 45 Although procedurally fair in a legal sense, the
trial cannot be considered procedurally fair in an ordinary sense given the absence
of significant exculpatory evidence.246 It therefore does not disrespect the jury's
role for the executive branch to give the case a fresh look when significant new
evidence is found. At that point, if the executive branch, acting through the
prosecutor, fairly concludes that the defendant is probably innocent, the State does
not have a compelling interest to continue punishing the defendant. Whatever
theoretical interest there may be in finality, it would not seem to measure up to the
state interest in avoiding punishment of the innocent.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR INVESTIGATIONS AND OTHER PROCEDURAL MEASURES
Few prosecutors would dispute that their professional role, at least in some
circumstances, includes investigating new evidence that suggests that a convicted
defendant may be innocent. Doing so is sometimes necessary to enable the
prosecutor to determine whether to attempt to rectify an innocent defendant's
wrongful conviction. Prosecutors must assume this responsibility because
convicted defendants generally lack the resources to uncover new evidence or to
242 See supra notes 26-29.
243 See supra note 28 and accompanying text (the standards have not been adopted by state
courts and are not legally enforceable).
244 Cf Tara L. Swafford, Responding to Herrera v. Collins: Ensuring that Innocents are not
Executed, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 603, 627 (1995) ("The best standard for achieving hearings for
meritorious new evidence claims is the 'probably innocent' standard, espoused in Justice Blackmun's
dissent in Herrera.").
245 See supra note 160.
246 See Zacharias, supra note 34, at 213 ("But when new information calls into question the
fairness of a prior proceeding, [a prosecutor] should not accord the conviction any presumption of
accuracy.").
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247follow up effectively on their own. The hard questions regard what investigative
steps must be taken, when and by whom.
One question is who should investigate and evaluate new evidence. Research
on cognitive bias suggests that this responsibility should not be entrusted to the
prosecutor who secured the conviction, and in many circumstances, should not be
entrusted to that prosecutor's office.248 However, the Dallas County experience
teaches that with appropriate leadership, structure and personnel, a large, urban
office can create an independent internal unit to follow up on new evidence and to
investigate post-conviction innocence claims. Similarly, smaller prosecutors'
offices could pool their resources to create a unit to investigate claims from each of
their counties, or they could seek the agreement of the state attorney general's
office to review such claims. Where an investigation and evaluation cannot be
conducted by an internal prosecutorial unit that maintains a non-adversarial and
open mindset to consider the potential of a wrongful conviction, it might be
preferable to adopt systems of review similar to those in England, Canada, or
North Carolina, that entrust investigations and evaluations to independent bodies
having internal, graduated processes for responding to new, exculpatory
evidence. 249
There are many factors relevant to whether an independent agency is
preferable to an internal unit. Aside from the need to minimize the impact of
cognitive bias, the culture in some prosecutors' offices does not give adequate
weight to the responsibility to avoid, much less correct, unjust convictions, 25° as is
247 Even prior to trial, defendants have comparatively limited resources. See Findley,
Innocents at Risk, supra note 31, at 897-98. Post-conviction, they may have none at all, since there is
no right to counsel after an appeal. In the Palladium case, for example, the two defendants
imprisoned for murder could not have known that an informant claimed that he and a fellow gang
member were responsible for the murder for which the defendants were convicted. Although the
defendants were fortunate enough to have lawyers, and were exceptional in that respect, their lawyers
still had nowhere near the access to witnesses and investigative resources available to the police and
prosecutor. See Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What the Courts Can Do To Improve the Delivery of
Criminal Defense Services, 63 U. Prrr. L. REv. 293 (2001-2002) (discussing funding problems
creating the institutionalized ineffectiveness of counsel); Tavernise, supra note 3.
248 See supra Part H.C.
249 Independent commissions such as that in North Carolina could be created on a statewide
basis to consider post-conviction claims. This would require legislation or a judicial mandate and a
companion budget to be effective. The office must have subpoena power and command the respect
of all actors in the system. Like an Inspector General, the post-conviction unit would consult with the
prosecutor who handled the case, but would be independent of that prosecutor.
250 The culture in some prosecutors' offices emphasizes conviction rates as the measure of
prosecutorial performance. See Medwed, Zeal Deal, supra note 32, at 170. Ironically, this attitude
may be particularly likely on the part of senior prosecutors, who are those most likely to be assigned
to reinvestigate a case after conviction. See Felkenes, supra note 126, at 111-12. In other offices,
the institutional culture may more readily permit a shift to an administrative model-for example, in
offices in which prosecutors have taken the initiative to conduct post-conviction review of cases. See
Gaertner, supra note 69; Goldberg & Siegel, supra note 33, at 394 n.21 (citing articles about
prosecutor-initiated reviews).
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reflected in the historical resistance in many jurisdictions to post-conviction
innocence claims, or even to DNA testing that might establish innocence .25 An
independent agency can serve as a repository of knowledge about innocence
claims. 25 2  Establishing an independent agency may also promote public
confidence in the reliability of the criminal justice process. While trial prosecutors
may be reluctant to share information about their cases or investigations with
253independent entities, in some jurisdictions, the advantages of independent
offices with trained professional post-conviction investigators would outweigh the
disadvantages.
On the other hand, as demonstrated by the Dallas experience, there are
advantages to effective internal units within prosecutor's offices. Especially where
there is an existing innocence project in the local area and the internal
prosecutorial unit has established a cooperative relationship with it, that model
might be preferable to an independent commission. The most effective model of
post-conviction review of wrongful convictions needs further study. No matter
what the model, where an individual defense lawyer or an innocence project is
investigating a wrongful conviction, the prosecutor's "investigative" role should
ordinarily include cooperating with the defense investigation by complying with
requests to provide investigative files, evidence for testing, and other relevant
information.254
251 Goldberg & Siegel, supra note 33, at 395 (noting that some "prosecutors have forced
defendants to engage in protracted litigation to obtain the evidence and the tests"); Kreimer &
Rudovsky, supra note 46, at 561-64 (discussing cases of prosecutorial resistance to post-conviction
DNA testing).
252 More than 230 DNA exonerations and the growing body of knowledge about their causes
and remedies point to the need for recognition of prosecutorial post-conviction review as a
specialized field with unique requirements for hiring and training for attorneys and investigators. The
post-conviction unit should be trained to understand the prevalence and effect of tunnel vision, the
lessons from prior innocence commissions, and unique local concerns and the other significant issues
in reviewing post-conviction claims. It can systematically gather information about issues unique in
the jurisdiction that lead to wrongful convictions. For example, if the credibility of an individual
police officer is questionable, the unit will be able to systematically use that information in other
cases. Where a particular prosecutor is known to be one who fails to address inconsistencies in
testimony in his cases, the independent unit can systematically utilize that knowledge as well. Ellen
Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and
Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 917 (1999) (quoting prosecutors about others who get wedded
to their theory of the case and ignore evidence that is inconsistent with it).
253 Prosecutors have traditionally argued that "exposing the inner working of their office and
policies would undermine their effectiveness" in law enforcement. Some have called for greater
transparency in prosecutors' offices to improve political accountability and confidence in the process.
See, e.g., Medwed, Zeal Deal, supra note 32, at 177-78.
254 See Medwed, Preaching, supra note 32; see also text accompanying n. 104-112 (noting the
possible advantages of internal units including access to files and personnel across jurisdictions,
development of expertise in the area, and potentially fostering strong relationships with innocence
projects thereby solidifying cooperation in submitting claims to court).
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In circumstances where the prosecutor's office can establish an effective post-
conviction unit internally, the chief prosecutor should, at a minimum, assign
principal responsibility for the investigation and evaluation to a prosecutor in the
office who did not participate in the earlier charging and trial decisions.25 5
Investigating and evaluating new evidence post-conviction are administrative
functions, not adversarial ones. Whoever engages in this work should not
reflexively seek to uphold the prior conviction, but should at least be neutral and
open-minded if not, as in the Dallas office, skeptical regarding the legitimacy of
the conviction. The ultimate question to resolve, we have suggested, is whether
the convicted defendant is probably innocent, in which event the prosecutor should
take reasonable steps, to the extent available, to rectify the conviction. The
prosecutors who obtained the conviction cannot easily switch hats and assume an
administrative attitude.
In the Palladium case, the district attorney eventually assigned the post-
conviction investigation to a senior prosecutor who had no prior involvement. But,
troublingly, the district attorney or his delegated higher-ups ultimately rejected the
prosecutor's recommendation that the office support the defendants' post-
convictions motions in light of his conclusion that they were probably innocent.
Although the district attorney, as an elected official, had ultimate responsibility for
the office's decisions, he could have deferred to the recommendation, given that he
had far less familiarity with the reinvestigation than the prosecutor who conducted
it and was more susceptible to biases that would influence one to justify the prior
conviction. In offices that conduct their own investigation of new evidence, some
thought must be given to the allocation of ultimate decision making authority
between the prosecutor assigned to investigate and superiors.256
A further question is when a post-conviction reinvestigation should
commence. ABA Model Rule 3.8(g) sets a high threshold, providing that
investigation need not commence until the prosecutor in the office where the
conviction was obtained learns of "new, credible and material evidence creating a
reasonable likelihood that" the convicted defendant is innocent.257  But the
disciplinary standard was not intended to imply that when exculpatory evidence
does not achieve that level of significance, it should be ignored. On the contrary,
the rule drafters assumed that, as a matter of discretion, prosecutors would give
new exculpatory evidence some level of scrutiny, often involving some initial
inquiry, to determine whether the evidence is significant enough to require
255 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Role of Prosecutors in Dealing with Police Abuse: The
Lessons of Los Angeles, 8 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 305, 321 (2001); Medwed, Zeal Deal, supra note
32, at 177-78; Sean Gardiner, The Prosecutor Takes Another Look: The DA's Role in Reversals,
NEWSDAY, Dec 10, 2002; http:/lxml.newsday.comltopic/ny-nyproslO30398 40dec l0,0,3307642.story
(describing how prosecutors in Queens County, New York actively reinvestigated three murder cases
and moved to set aside all three verdicts).
256 Green & Zacharias, supra note 202 (discussing allocation of decision making authority in
federal criminal prosecutions).
257 A.B.A. MODEL RuLES, supra note 26.
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disclosure to the defendant and to the court and to necessitate a more substantial
reinvestigation. The Canadian and English procedures serve as examples of
graduated processes; ideally, any office established to investigate new claims or
evidence of innocence will similarly establish protocols.
That is not to say that every complaint from a convicted defendant deserves a
reinvestigation. A threshold question is whether new exculpatory evidence has
been uncovered by the prosecutor or called to his attention by the convicted
defendant or another third party.2 58 No doubt, many complaints that come to a
prosecutor's office do not require investigation because they do not involve a claim
of innocence at all. 59 Other complaints can be screened out immediately, or
quickly, because they are frivolous on their face or because they simply reargue
evidence that was presented to the jury.
Experience suggests, however, that a prosecutor who learns of new
exculpatory evidence should not rule out the need for investigation based simply
on the strength or nature of the trial evidence. In many cases in which defendants
were eventually exonerated by DNA testing, the evidence previously appeared
overwhelming, 260 leading courts to reject claims that confessions, eyewitness
identifications, forensic evidence, or informant testimony were false or unreliable
or to conclude that any procedural errors were harmless.26 1 The fact that the
defendant pleaded guilty may be strong proof, but it should not be taken to
258 The Conviction Integrity Unit (CIU) in Texas views this as akin to the federal standard in
civil cases for dismissal of a claim, FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Ware Interview, supra note 172.
259 The Texas experience indicates that at least 25% of claims had nothing to do with factual
innocence and could readily be dismissed. These included complaints about judges, their attorney,
and the food in prison. In a large percentage of other cases, the CIU "strains to fill in the blanks" to
determine whether there is factual claim of innocence. Ware Interview, supra note 172. Where it is
not clear whether a claim of innocence is being made, a return telephone call, conversation or letter
should relatively quickly be able to resolve the ambiguity.
260 Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 55, at 61 (in exoneration cases, appellate courts
held that the evidence of guilt was "overwhelming;" of the 200 DNA exonerations, only 14% of all
cases were overturned on appeal; 9% were non-capital cases).
261 Id. The appellate system presumes that the trial verdict is correct, and places the burden on
the person convicted to demonstrate a substantial error. Doctrines of deference, while perhaps
permanent fixtures of our judicial system, have often resulted in substantial shortcomings when it
comes to a court's willingness-and a convicted person's ability-to investigate and consider new
facts. A study of appeals filed by people who were later exonerated by DNA testing shows that
claims ranging from prosecutorial misconduct to witness recantations were almost uniformly
dismissed. "Far from recognizing innocence," the study notes, "courts often denied relief by finding
errors to be harmless." Id. at 55. Moreover evidentiary rules at trial that prevent alternate theories
and facts from consideration (such as limited admissibility of evidence suggesting an alternate
perpetrator), the deferential view of factual guilt determinations by the jury as well as the harmless
error standard all foster tunnel vision thereby preventing a careful review for factual innocence. See
Findley, Innocents at Risk, supra note 31, at 898-930; Findley & Scott, supra note 32, at 321 ("With
hindsight knowledge that a jury found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, judges are
likely to be predisposed to view the conviction as both inevitable and a sound decision, despite a
procedural or constitutional error in the proceedings."); Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of
Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of lneffective Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1.
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262preclude the possibility of innocence. 2 On the other hand, the nature of the trial
evidence may suggest that reinvestigation is particularly justified. For example, it
is now understood that eyewitness identifications are highly fallible,263 and that
scientific tests can be less reliable than they once seemed.26
Similarly, experience suggests that reinvestigations should not be ruled out
simply because of the nature of the new exculpatory evidence. Prosecutors tend to
mistrust witness recantations, but not all witness recantations are false.265
Likewise, prosecutors tend to mistrust jailhouse informants who provide
exculpatory (as distinguished from incriminating) evidence. But not all stories
from inmates about that one prisoner who admitted to another prisoner's crime are
false.266 Experience with false confessions (such as those in the Central Park
Jogger case) suggests that confessions similarly should not be regarded as
conclusive evidence of guilt.
267
Nor should new evidence be ignored simply because it would not qualify as
"newly discovered" for purposes of doctrines governing judicial review.268 For
262 Nine of the 200 exonerations studied by Garrett have been innocent people who have
pleaded guilty. See Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 55, at 60, 74. Some jurisdictions do not
permit DNA testing where a person has pled guilty. See Garrett, Claiming Innocence, supra note 94,
at 1680.
263 See supra note 54.
264 See supra note 55.
265 Two well-known DNA exonerations illustrate this. The first involved Frank Lee Smith,
who was convicted of raping and murdering a child in Broward County, Florida, and sentenced to
death. Five years after the conviction, a key prosecution witness who had claimed to have seen Smith
outside the victim's house on the night of the attack, provided a sworn affidavit stating that she had
been mistaken in her testimony and that she had these doubts at the time of the trial, but that "[t]he
state attorney told me not to worry about my testimony because the man would be locked up and
electrocuted the following May. He also pointed out the man's entire family to me. I was just feeling
so pressured." Smith v. Dugger, 565 So. 2d 1293, 1296 (Fla. 1990). Smith's habeas petition based
in part on the recantation was opposed at every step and was rejected by all the courts reviewing it,
yet DNA testing ultimately proved that another man was the perpetrator. The other case involved
Gary Dotson, who was convicted of aggravated rape in Cook County, Illinois, and sentenced to 25-
50 years in prison. Long after his conviction, Dotson sought a new trial based upon the recantation of
the complainant, who now testified that she had had consensual intercourse, and, fearing she was
pregnant (and the reaction that would ensue from her legal guardians), had essentially injured herself
and ripped up her clothes to make it look like a rape. Again, the recantation was disbelieved by the
prosecution and reviewing courts. People v. Dotson, 516 N.E.2d 718 (111. App. Ct. 1987). Dotson
was exonerated by DNA evidence only years later. See Innocence Project, supra note 22, at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/89.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
266 A notorious example is Chris Ochoa who, under severe police coercion, falsely confessed
and then pled guilty to a homicide. Eight years later, another inmate imprisoned for life wrote to
state officials confessing to the murder. DNA testing established that this man was the perpetrator
and Ochoa was eventually set free. See Diane Jennings, A Shaken System, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Feb. 24, 2008, at IA.
267 See supra note 124; Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 55, at 89; Richard A. Leo,
POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JuSTIcE 195 (2008).
268 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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example, the fact that a defense lawyer could have discovered the new evidence by
reasonable diligence does not mean that the evidence is not credible or significant
enough to justify an investigation. While the failure to use the evidence may
reflect the defendant's recognition that the evidence was not credible or defense
counsel's recognition that the evidence was not important, it may alternatively
reflect that defense counsel was simply unaware of the evidence or of its
importance or that defense counsel was under-zealous. 69 Some courts refuse to
regard a co-defendant's exculpatory testimony as "newly discovered," even if the
co-defendant was previously unwilling to testify and had a right not to do so,270 but
there is no reason to take the same position in exercising prosecutorial discretion to
revisit past convictions. A co-defendant's exonerating account may turn out to be
corroborated and prove more consistent with other evidence than the prosecution's
theory at trial.
Another question is how extensively new evidence must be investigated. It is
hard to imagine hard and fast answers. Thus, ABA Model Rule 3.8(g) simply
contemplates sufficient investigation to enable the prosecutor "to determine
whether the defendant is in fact innocent" (or, in a jurisdiction where the
prosecutor lacks investigative resources, "reasonable efforts to cause another
appropriate authority to undertake the necessary investigation"). 27' The extent of
272the investigation will vary with the circumstances. No rational system of
resource allocation would require completely reinvestigating from scratch
whenever significant, new exculpatory evidence was uncovered. But on the other
hand, as the Palladium case illustrates, the necessary reinvestigation will
sometimes be lengthier and more extensive than the one that led to a conviction.
269 Stephen B. Bright, Turning Celebrated Principles into Reality, THE CHAMPION (Nat'l Ass'n
of Crim. Def. Law.), Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 6 (discussing widespread problems of ineffective assistance
of counsel); Jeffrey Levinson, Don't Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Raising the Standard for Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 38 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 147 (2001) (same). Ineffective Assistance of Counsel is
one of the six leading causes of wrongful convictions. Innocence Project, supra note 22, at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Bad-Lawyering.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
270 See, e.g., United States v. Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d 1184, 1188 (9th Cir. 1992) (post-trial
statement of codefendant who refused to testify at trial does not constitute newly discovered
evidence); United States v. Offutt, 736 F.2d 1199, 1202 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Dale, 991
F.2d 819, 838-39 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("The unanimous view of circuits that have considered the
question is that [the requirement that the evidence be discovered after trial] is not met simply by
offering the post-trial testimony of a co-conspirator who refused to testify at trial."). See generally
Mary Ellen Brennan, Note, Interpreting the Phrase "Newly Discovered Evidence ": May Previously
Unavailable Exculpatory Testimony Serve as the Basis for a Motion for a New Trial Under Rule 33?,
77 FoRDnaM L. REv. 1095 (2008).
271 A.B.A. MODEL RuLES, supra note 26, at R. 3.8, cmt. 7.
272 For example, if an eyewitness advises the prosecutor that he is no longer certain of his
identification, at least a brief discussion with the witness is warranted. If the discussion does not lead
to more specific information, and the prosecutor has no other reason to question the conviction and
no further leads, then the investigation might be concluded. On the other hand, the witness may state
his belief that he made a misidentification more strongly and credibly, warranting a review of the file
and additional inquiry.
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Considerations bearing on the length and nature of the reinvestigation may include
the strength and weaknesses in the underlying case, the age and capacity of the
defendant, 73 the lawyers and judge involved, the existing case law, the state of
scientific and investigative procedures at the time of conviction, alternative
suspects who were discounted early in the process, other information available to
the prosecution that was not required to be produced to the defense, use of
informants, and other factors.274
Depending on the circumstances, a prosecutor who follows leads and is open-
minded may take any number of steps. He may engage in discussion with trial and
appellate counsel, read the trial transcript, talk with witnesses, review the evidence,
275
request polygraph examinations , engage his own experts or pursue other avenues
to dig into the facts.276 Certainly, the trial prosecutor has the greatest information
to offer about the case and the conviction, including information about the
strengths and weaknesses in the case; whether he had questions about testimony of
certain witnesses; his impression of the defendant's testimony and of the police
investigation; and whether there was exculpatory information that was not deemed
material and not disclosed to the defense,277 including whether there was evidence
that another person might be the perpetrator.2 78 The prosecutor reinvestigating the
case should also consider the quality of the defense counsel, given that ineffective
assistance of counsel is a rampant criminal justice problem and among the leading
causes of wrongful convictions.279
A post-conviction unit necessarily will be called upon to make difficult
choices in the exercise of discretion as to the extent of any investigation, and
considerations may weigh against taking potentially fruitful steps. For example,
the prosecutor may have to consider whether to contact the victim, given that the
process may be traumatic for the victim. If a case involves DNA, at what point
should the prosecution request the victim's DNA? What about collecting the DNA
273 See Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 55, at 89 (empirical studies demonstrating
increased risk of false convictions, notably by false confessions, for juveniles and people with mental
disabilities); Gross et. al, supra note 23, at 544-47.
274 Eyewitness identification is the leading cause of wrongful convictions. See sources cited
supra note 54. To the extent that the underlying conviction is based upon discredited or questionable
eyewitness identification procedures, it should be carefully examined. This is equally true for various
forensic science techniques, the method of obtaining confessions and the use ofjailhouse informants.
275 Gershman, supra note 33, at 349 n.215 (suggesting that polygraphs are used by prosecutors
to clear innocent suspects).
276 Similar procedures were used in the Palladium and Central Park jogger cases. See supra
notes 6 & 122.
277 Prosecutors often mistakenly apply the appellate standard at the pretrial stage to determine
whether or not they must disclose "material" exculpatory evidence. Kevin C. McMunigal, Guilty
Pleas, Brady Disclosure, and Wrongful Convictions, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 651 (2007).
278 JoHN GRiSHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN: MURDER AND INJUSTICE IN A SMALL ToWN (2006);
Randall Coyne, Dead Wrong in Oklahoma, 42 TULSA L. REv. 209 (2006).
279 DWYER ET AL., supra note 22.
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of her now-estranged husband when the victim claims that if the police contact
him, he will retaliate against her? There are no simple or generic answers.
At some point, further investigation may seem unproductive and evidence
must be evaluated and a conclusion drawn. Unlike in cases where defendants have
been exonerated by DNA testing (i.e., proven to be innocent), the determination is
likely to be murkier, which is why unbiased decision making is at a premium. If
witnesses recant, are they truthful now or were they truthful at trial? If new
witnesses are uncovered, are they credible? The question should not be whether
the prosecutor is certain of the defendant's guilt or innocence, but how certain or
uncertain and, ultimately, whether innocence is sufficiently likely to warrant taking
steps to correct an apparent error.
When a prosecutor concludes that a convicted defendant is reasonably likely
to be innocent, the appropriate steps may vary depending on the jurisdiction, since,
as discussed, not all states afford a judicial remedy, and in those that do, the
standard for relief varies. Where courts do have authority to provide relief, what is
the prosecutor's role? There is no reason to approach the judicial process from an
adversarial perspective, once having made an administrative determination that the
defendant is probably innocent. Rather, the prosecutor should be forthright about
his conclusion and ensure that the court receives the relevant, exculpatory
evidence. In the Palladium case, for example, the assistance provided by the
prosecutor to the defense may seem anomalous given his office's initial position
that the defendants were not entitled to new trials. But given the prosecutor's
conclusion that the defendants were innocent, the problem may not be that he was
under-zealous but that he was over-zealous in failing to take that position in court
and in formally putting the defendants to their proof.
V. CONCLUSION
We have suggested that, in exercising its discretion after obtaining a
conviction, a prosecutor's office should investigate significant new evidence that
suggests that the convicted defendant was innocent. If the office then concludes
that the defendant was probably innocent, it should take measures, whether by
supporting an application for judicial relief or by supporting a pardon application,
to correct the apparent mistake. No doubt, objections can be raised to this proposal
both conceptually and in its application. Chief among these would be objections
about the administrative expense and burden, about the number of false claims of
innocence that would be filed, about the impact of reinvestigations on victims and
on the public perception, and about other purported harms that might eventuate.
It may be argued, for example, that there are too many wrongly convicted
defendants. These may include not only imprisoned defendants but others who
have been burdened, including those whose convictions have had a significant
impact upon their access to jobs and housing or their immigration status. Further,
the number of undeserving, convicted defendants who would claim innocence,
pointing to new exculpatory evidence, will be a multiple of those who in fact were
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innocent. It may be feared that the error-correction function-of finding the few
wrongly convicted defendants-will overwhelm prosecutors' offices.
We have chosen not to anticipate and address possible objections in the
abstract, but instead propose that prosecutors' offices proceed incrementally by
establishing post-conviction review mechanisms, insuring independence from the
prosecutors who handled the case, as did the Dallas district attorney's office, and
setting priorities. For example, prosecutors might begin by reviewing new
evidence in death penalty cases and cases where defendants have been or will be in
prison for lengthy periods of time. Experience will then show whether the demand
of reviewing convictions is burdensome or manageable, and how the process can
be improved and made more efficient. Experience will also provide more
information about how often the ordinary investigation, trial and guilt-plea
processes result in potentially false convictions, and why that occurs. Ultimately,
experience will tell whether less need be done, or more should be done, to promote
the reliability of the criminal justice process. If a prosecutor's responsibility as
"minister of justice" truly includes a responsibility to take "special precautions ...
to prevent and to recti the conviction of innocent persons, 280 as the ABA-and
we-believe it does, then initial efforts such as these should be taken by all
prosecutors' offices, not just an innovative few.
280 A.B.A. MODEL RULES, supra note 26, at R. 3.8, cmt. 1 (emphasis added).

